# Round 3---Texas 21

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#### Competitiveness is built on taken-for-granted nationalism---the search for “anticompetitive practices” creates a reinforcing cycle of otherization. Before “prohibiting” anticompetitive life we must ask who we must compete against and who is the “we” that competes.

Pauli Kettunen 21. Professor of Political History in the Social Science Faculty of University of Helsinki. "Welfare state, competition state, security state: Nationalism in nation-state responses to crossborder mobilities." In Remapping Security on Europe’s Northern Borders, pp. 201-220. Routledge, 2021.

Democratic welfare nationalism, competitiveness-seeking nationalism, and security-seeking nationalism appear as rational nation-state policies and are generally not associated with nationalism. It is reasonable to argue that the persistent limits of the conventional use of “nationalism” outside specialist studies of nations and nationalism indicate the power of nationalism as a taken-for-granted mode of thought and action. Taken-for-granted nationalism seems to be reinforced by the intertwining of democratic welfare nationalism with competitiveness-seeking and security-seeking nationalism. There is thus a self-reinforcing circle. The extent to which globalisation is defined as a national challenge reinforces the role of competitiveness and security in political agenda setting, and the extent to which competitiveness and security frame the political agenda assists them to maintain national perspectives to globalisation.

From the welfare-state, competition-state, and security-state perspectives “nationalism” is not a tool for self-description, but for condemning xenophobic and racist far-right nationalism. However, the taken-for-granted nationalism justifying the nation-state limits of these perspectives provides a readymade framework for xenophobic nationalism. The distinctions between us and others and between the internal and external are a shared point of departure, but instead of policies recognising their interdependencies, xenophobic nationalism turns the us-other distinction into an exclusionary us-against-them divide, and the internal-external distinction into a motive for stricter borders.

The emphasis on the national “us” in mainstream modes of combining welfare-state, competition-state, and security-state arguments may facilitate populist protests that accuse the elite of betraying the people. There are similarities with how the nation as an imagined community provided subordinated social groups with the criteria for a collective critique of existing society and created preconditions for the labour movement. However, while the working class was able to motivate its demands by referring to its central role in the production of life’s necessities, the social divides associated with current projects for a national competitive community give little scope for such arguments.

We may find that an insoluble tension appears between what is recognised as the institutional preconditions of competitiveness, and how its content is conceived. At the same time as egalitarian institutions and participatory practices can be defended as preconditions for knowledge-based competitiveness, true membership in a competitive community is a matter of individual competitiveness. This in turn consists of communicative and innovative skills, talent, and a reflexive capacity to monitor oneself from the perspective of competitiveness. Besides winners and losers, some people cannot even participate in this competition.

Individual deficiencies or the unavoidable imperatives of the global economy tend to be offered as explanations for grievances. Welfare-state policies aim to improve individual capacities and compensate for job losses, yet it is far from self-evident that people willingly accept individualised or naturalised explanations. Political implications may be found in constructions demarcating collective threat images and in the support for right-wing populist parties that have managed, not least in the Nordic countries, to merge nostalgic welfare nationalism and xenophobic nationalism.

While the emphasis on “us” in the making of national competitive communities is an integral part of global capitalism, the same transformations may also either erode the solidarity based on common spatial ties or open new crossnational and crossterritorial perspectives for defining “us”. A multicircle non-divisive understanding of “us” would arguably require a transnational democratic dimension in defining problems and solutions. Inspiration may be found in the ideas of policy coordination beyond nation states and European regional integration that Gunnar Myrdal proposed in his 1950s critique of the nationalism of democratic Western welfare states. In any case, even good answers to questions of national competitiveness and security fail to answer questions of democracy, citizenship, social equality, and the ecological preconditions of life. There is a risk that the reinforced emphasis on the competition-state and security-state aspects of the nation state will make it even more difficult to formulate such questions to effectively recognise that they are simultaneously local, national, European, and global.

#### Competition defines “us” through total war---the virtuous cycle of Darwinist competition eliminates morality.

Pauli Kettunen 97. Professor of Political History in the Social Science Faculty of University of Helsinki. "The society of virtuous circles." Models, modernity and the Myrdals (1997): 158-159. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pauli-Kettunen/publication/310465167\_myrdal97/data/582ee82d08aef19cb815235b/myrdal97.doc

There was, thus, a possibility of virtuous circle between national integration and welfare, and international integration and balance. Here, however, Myrdal's "created harmony" was clearly a criterion of an immanent critique of the Welfare State. Applying my account of the Nordic notion of society, I would interpret his position in the following way. On the national level planning made efficiency, solidarity and democracy become values and properties of society and 'us'. These values of national society and national 'us' each had an international dimension. Democracy meant international manifestation of the democratic model of society; solidarity was widened to international solidarity; and efficiency meant international economic competitiveness. But there was a big difficulty: it was very obvious that 'us' defined through international competitiveness and 'us' defined through international solidarity were not identical. The actor of the virtuous circle of national and international integration could not be 'us' defined through international competitiveness but here 'us' had to be based upon "the international idealism of all people, which I believe is a reality", as Myrdal wrote in 1960 (Myrdal 1960, 214).

This past vision of future may be contrasted with the recent description of present by Riccardo Petrella, a leading figure in the adminstration of social reseach in the European Union. The year is 1995. According to Petrella economic competitiveness

has become the prime objective bit just of enterprises but also of the State and of society as a whole. ... The 'gospel of competition', like all ideologies, boils down to a few simple ideas. We are engaged willy nilly - so the industrialists, economists, political leaders and academics tell us - in a ruthless technological, industrial and economic war encompassing the entire planet. The aim is to survive, and survival hinges on being competitive. Otherwise there is no short- and long-term salvation, no growth, no economic and social welfare. The chief role of State, local authorities and trades unions is to provide the most suitable environment for enterprises to be, become or stay competitive in the world economic war. (Petrella 1995, 11-12)

Petrella's sarcastic description of Darwinist competition for survival is a description of a way in which national society is reproduced in the globalized economy after the liberation of finance markets and after the disappearance of the Cold War confrontation and moral competition between different types of society. It is important to note that in his criticism of the enthusiastic construction of national competition strategies, Petrella is not in the first place talking about "bad" strategies of social dumping and the lowering of social costs. Rather, he is talking about "good" value-added strategies which are based on process and product innovation, education and training, increased competence, stronger attention to "human capital" by means of "human resource management", etc.

Petrella warns about breaking up of the social contract. But he is not talking about the same thing as Touraine who writes that we "no longer belong to a society, a social class or a nation to the extent that our lives are in part determined by the world market, and in part confined to a world of personal life, interpersonal relations and cultural traditions" (Touraine 1994, 373). Neither is Petrella talking about the dissolution of society in the sense of Lash and Urry who point to vanishing borders and growing reflexivity of actors in the process of globalization. On the contrary, Petrella identifies a very national and very influential way of reacting and contributing to globalization, in which competition of nations, firms and individuals is the main expression of "reflexive modernization" (cf. Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994).

There are, no doubt, different views about the role of nation-state and national society in globalizing capitalism. In this book The Work of Nations. Preparing ourselves for 21st century capitalism (1991) Robert B. Reich, the Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration, argues for the thesis that there are no more national economies, there is only a global economy. But according to Reich, this very condition can liberate the national society of the imperatives of international economic competition. The national society could survive and even strengthen as a basis of social solidarity and as a basis of policies which contribute to the progress of global economy (Reich 1991, 301-315).

National society without national economy - without stopping to discuss the probability of this vision we may see that it is different from Myrdal's national and international "created harmony", despite the "international idealism" common to Myrdal and Reich.

However, the vision of another Harvard economist, Michael E. Porter, seems to offer more influential way of giving both role and meaning to national society. His book The Competitive Advantage of the Nations (1990) is an argument for a central role of nation as "home base" for globally operating and globally competitive enterprises. Crucial competitive advantages are created in national contexts, especially those that are based on innovation and competence. This argument attracts policy-makers and -planners. Even the defence of the Nordic institutions of industrial relations may get new legitimation as it is taught that high standards of working life and participation of employees are sources of innovation and thus competitiveness. The way is open to positive value-added competition strategies. In their connection many good things can be included in the argumentation for economic competitiveness. You can argue for moral, ecological, or aesthetic values without being obliged to use moral, ecological, or aesthetic arguments; you just prove that they promote economic competitiveness.

Obviously, this is a kind of virtuous circle. And it is not so very different from the old virtuous circle of the Swedish Model or Myrdal's thought. It is important to note that the vulgarized Keynesian notion of the virtuous circle between increased production and increased consumption does not adequately catch the main economic concern of Myrdal and other Swedish Social Democrats. They had a remarkable supply-side interest already in the 1930s, expressed, for example, in the plan of the Myrdals for the raising of the quality of human material in Sweden (cf. Esping-Andersen 1992, 45). A major concern was to release the creative resources of the people. This was a precondition for social equality and welfare, but still more, promoting social equality was seen as the means by which these human resources would be released.

Now, there is here a crucial difference between the old and new virtuous circles. Social equality and social solidarity have been dropped outside the virtuous circle in the project for competitive innovation. It is not through more equality that people are supposed to become more innovative and more competitive. And in the Nordic countries we carry a historical burden to which the Myrdals for their part contributed: all good things have to form a virtuous circle and only such things are good that can be placed in the virtuous circle of society.

#### “We” are in a moment of crisis that requires new terms of debate---the current order cannot address violence until the very concepts of “the public” is rewritten.

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The lesson we draw from these studies is that crises do not generate changes in norms and practices deterministically through some sort of metaphysical shock wave. Normative and practical changes are consequences of altered perceptions of meaning. Crises throw social meaning into disarray, fracturing seemingly settled accounts of who “we” are; whose social contributions are most important; how to speak about causes and effects; feasible scales of social coordination; what can and cannot be tolerated; and how to demonstrate accountability. In crises, contestations of meaning become more explicit. Claims that certain perspectives are beyond the pale have less clout. Ideas that had an incipient, but marginal presence in pre-crisis thinking might begin to be taken seriously. A mixture of nervous conjecture and confident extemporisation inflect the public conversation, undermining abiding certainties.

Faced with a historically exceptional combination of global pandemic and economic depression, some citizens and politicians reach for a new language of civic reflection. This is because any hope of tackling the unprecedented debt pressures, market failures, infrastructural collapse, population immobility, intensifying inequalities and collective trauma generated by the crisis will not only call for imaginative, coordinated and massively resourced policy responses, but a new way of talking about policy that is not weighed down by obsolete categories. In short, much depends upon whether people can find a common frame of reflection that will enable them to think, speak and act upon what binds them together as well as what divides them.

Politics arises when people disagree, and now that there are more and bigger problems than ever to disagree about it is vitally important to find ways of arguing that do not exacerbate uncertainty or intolerance. In any political disagreement there are two matters at stake: firstly, the nature of the dispute; secondly, the competing options for action. The second cannot be realised unless there is some clarity surrounding the first. The political theorist, William Connolly (1993, 2) suggests that the distinction between these tasks can be compared to the conventionally agreed meanings set out for juries before they deliberate on a legal case:

The jury examines the evidence and reaches a verdict but prior to its deliberations, the judge, acting as the official interpreter of the law, charges the jury with a set of responsibilities, establishes what can be considered as evidence, and specifies what constitutes a punishable offense … In charging the jury and in regulating the presentation of evidence to it, the judge, we might say, specifies the terms within which the jury considers evidence and reaches a verdict.

Of course, democratic public debate does not take place in a courtroom in which the rules of discourse can be laid down by an authoritative judge. The contestability of the terms of political discourse by the people themselves is a fundamental precondition of democracy. People must not only be able to have their say, but to determine what they are talking about; what matters and what things mean. This entails a capacity to argue about the very norms that underpin policy decisions and to communicate across differences, acknowledging normative disagreements as necessary features of political communication. It is to these matters of normative contestation that we refer when we suggest that “the new normal” depends upon finding a refreshed language of democratic citizenship. What form might this discursive reconfiguration take? How might it be incorporated into an emerging vernacular of civic discourse?

Re-Thinking the Space, Mediation and Contestation of Citizenship

Citizenship involves the performance of norms and practices through which people are bound to strangers within communities of co-existence. The traditional liberal conception of citizenship sees it as a relationship between individuals and the state entailing the exercise of duties and rights. Citizenship in this sense is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a polity. Anyone who possesses this status is equal, having all the rights and duties that come with legally sanctioned legitimacy. No universal principle determines what those rights and duties shall be, but over time societies tend to create images of the ideal citizen and direct individuals to aspire to them (Marshall 1964).

In contrast to this legalistic notion of citizenship, there is a broader, less state-bound characterisation which sees it as comprising a repertoire of practices that people inherit and devise in order to co-exist interdependently with others. In this broader sense, to act as a citizen is to engage in public situations of various kinds with people one might not know and who might not share one’s interests, tastes, values, or even language. Sometimes civic interactions will involve relations with governments, authorities, or employers. At other times they will relate to quotidian ways of living amongst neighbours and strangers. Performances of citizenship are both framed institutionally, conforming to conventional notions of political and civic participation (voting, joining parties and campaigns, following the news) and improvised from below, often transcending or resisting established civic scripts. Through such extemporised forms of social practice, citizens create what Arendt (1958, 198) refers to as “spaces of appearance”: “the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men (sic) exist not merely like other living or inanimate things, but make their appearance explicitly.”

The crisis induced by the pandemic raises fundamental questions about how citizens are to “make their appearance explicitly.” Most of the decisions and regulations responding to the crisis have been framed by political elites and legitimised by appeals to expert wisdom. Public involvement in shaping or making such decisions has been extremely limited, raising questions about the role of democratic publics in responding to critical issues that affect them. Moves to democratise crisis response are bound to consider fundamental questions about who constitutes “the public” (given the need to respond to social challenges that transcend political borders); how civic discourse is mediated (given the need to generate global narratives, conversations and concerted actions in the face of common threats) and how political differences can be both recognised and negotiated (given the urgent need for pluralistic publics to work through complex problems). It is to these questions that we now turn.

Constituting the Public Domain

The global pandemic has brought into sharp focus the spatial framing of political problems within national boundaries. Since the middle of the seventeenth century, politics has been conceived as “taking place” within national units characterised by territorial borders, sovereign authority, civically attached populations and bounded economic interests. The emergence of nation-states as a natural scale of political action and analysis is the defining feature of the Westphalian order in which to govern is to protect and enhance national state interests; to be a citizen is to belong to a nation state, thereby bound by specific geo-political responsibilities and rights; and to speak of democracy in an empirically meaningful sense is to refer to a mode of legitimacy operating at the nation-state level. The Westphalian view of political place established a firm distinction between domestic and foreign domains; inside and outside; the scope of national control and extraneous precariousness.

The robustness of these conceptual categories of inter-national social order have been called into question by the speed and density of global economic and cultural interconnections that have become increasingly manifest since the late twentieth century. The conception of the globally dominant capitalist market as a “world system” was elaborated in the mid-1970s by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 390) who urged social scientists to abandon the reification of the nation-state as the primary unit of politico-economic analysis. He argued that capitalism could only operate as a world economy “with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems.” In short, states might be distinguished by cultural characteristics and domestic political projects, but they cannot escape their enmeshment in a global system of interdependent economic relations. Some theorists have celebrated globalisation as a modernising force, while others have warned against its homogenising flattening of cultures. Rejecting the simplistic notion of globalisation as “a single society and culture occupying the planet” (Waters 1995), more nuanced theorists have observed that the contemporary world is characterised by a marked tension between the specificity of place and the overriding dynamics of a global system. The latter frequently overrides the particularities of national statehood, economy and culture, while state actors do what they can to assert their independence. It makes sense to think of there being “multiple, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory globalisms” (Tsing 2000, 342), with states reshaping their territorial claims “on to both sub- and supra-national geographical scales” (Brenner 1999, 65). Such framing and reframing of political space depend as much upon symbolic mediation as upon the rules, treaties and logics of transnational institutions. In short, globalisation entails an ongoing struggle to tell people where and to what they belong.

The Covid-19 health crisis is a primary example of this battle to frame a global event. Most people acknowledge that the pandemic is truly global, albeit disparately pernicious in different parts of the world, and at different times. In relation to the urgent need for global coordination to find a vaccine, the insular ambitions of nations or regions seem manifestly petty and irrelevant. However, that has not stopped nationalist leaders from playing blame games in which they ascribe the origin of the virus to nefarious foreign states, or from making boastful claims that their public health strategy is “world-beating” rather than simply functional. Rarely has the disconnect between bombastic national rhetoric and empirical global reality seemed more conspicuous.

Given that the most pressing and intractable contemporary challenges can only be addressed through global coordination, the challenge of finding effective ways of communicating and acting beyond national silos seems more urgent than ever. From the spread of viruses to regulation of the environment, and from the direction of migration flows to the looming catastrophe of climate change, nation-states appear to be Canute-like before the irresistible waves of globalism. Left to themselves, nations squabble about who should take responsibility, constantly deferring meaningful action until others have made a move.

The inescapably global nature of the pandemic has shown the futility and risk of such an approach, casting doubt upon the pursuit of national solutions and pointing towards the urgency of appeals to transnational public agency. Faced with globally diffuse problems of viral contagion, climate change and market instability, the civic case for stretching the use and meaning of the term “we, the public” becomes compelling. This important shift in collective self-consciousness entails the adoption of what Nancy Fraser (2007, 21) refers to as “the all-affected principle”:

Today, … the idea that citizenship can serve as a proxy for affectedness is no longer plausible. Under current conditions, one’s conditions of living do not depend wholly on the internal constitution of the political community of which one is a citizen. Although the latter remains undeniably relevant, its effects are mediated by other structures, both extra and non-territorial, whose impact is at least as significant … In general, globalization is driving a widening wedge between affectedness and political membership. As those two notions increasingly diverge, the effect is to reveal the former as an inadequate surrogate for the latter.

It follows from Fraser’s analysis that “what turns a collection of people into fellow members of a public is not shared citizenship, but their co-imbrication in a common set of structures and/or institutions that affect their lives” (ibid, 22). The logic of the all-affected principle rejects the notion that only national publics can confer democratic legitimacy, as the latter depends upon registering the voices of all those who are potentially affected by a problem, notwithstanding their national labels. This amounts to a post-Westphalian conception of citizenship in which, rather than being fragmented by artificial political divisions, the public is characterised by its common vulnerabilities, experiences and capacities. Members of post-Westphalian publics will continue to disagree with one another, of course, but the public sphere within which such political disagreement takes place will correspond to the dimensions of the issues at stake.

To be clear, it is only through the emergence of a cosmopolitan public domain in which solidarities are rooted in common affectedness rather than national-legal identities that global challenges such as the pandemic and economic depression, as well as climate change and other environmental threats, can be tackled democratically. This does not amount to a utopian call for citizens to adopt an abstractly cosmopolitan stance. Already competing with discourses of nationalism and populism in contemporary societies are many millions of voices across the world who view social problems from the perspective of a universal humanity sharing a common home. Such people are more inclined “to take risks by virtue of encountering the ‘other’” and to possess “some ability to reflect upon and judge aesthetically between different natures, places and societies” (Szerszynskiand and Urry 2002, 470). By understanding that “[g]lobalisation has brought large swathes of the world’s population closer together” in overlapping communities of fate (Held 2003, 478), many contemporary campaigners for social justice frame their arguments in terms of a language of cosmopolitan sensibility. These include movements opposing the structural inequalities of transnational economic power (such as Occupy Wall Street), ecological depredation (the School Strike for Climate Change), institutional sexism (MeToo) and racism (Black Lives Matter). The effectiveness of these campaigns in bringing injustices to global attention does not entail abandoning national institutions and populations as if they no longer matter, but framing messages to affected citizens within a cosmopolitan context that celebrates openness to global heterogeneity, pluralism and nuance.

As the pandemic highlights the limitations of the Westphalian conception of “normal” by forcing people from across the world to face up to their interdependence, both in terms of the transnational porosity of contagion and the resources needed to contain it, it calls attention to the aptness of a “new normal” in which shared social problems are addressed on a new scale. This adjustment of scale calls into being new conceptions of the public, defined increasingly in terms of shared affectedness.

Given that the most urgent crisis facing the world in the aftermath of the pandemic will be the threat of global catastrophe caused by climate change, the world is increasingly dependent upon the practical effectiveness of calls to action that are couched in a language of citizenship that transcends state borders and prioritises shared affectedness. The challenge of co-ordinating moral and political responses with a view to enhancing the public’s global agency is now a prerequisite for even modest success of efforts to save the planet from systemically wrought depredation. Could the public that has begun to develop a consciousness of its collective global vulnerability during the pandemic act upon such awareness beyond the current crisis?

#### Cosmopolitization is ontological---the nation-state makes survival impossible, engaging in double exclusion: excluding the excluded from consideration.

Ulrich Beck 14. Institute of Sociology, Munich, Germany. “We Do Not Live in an Age of Cosmopolitanism but in an Age of Cosmopolitization: The ‘Global Other’ is in Our Midst.” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7124081/

Nation

But the same is true for the macro level as well. Like climate change, most of the main impetuses for social and economic transformations in the new century do not differentially or exclusively apply to certain limited groups of nations. Consider the following: global free trade and financialization, corporate deterritorialization and transnationalized production, globalized policy consulting and formulation (coerced by the International Monetary Fund, etc.), and, last but not least, globally financed and managed regional wars (Chang 2010b: 444–445).

There are no permanent systematic hierarchies, sequences or selectivities by which different groups of nations—whether at different levels of development, in different regions or of different ethnicities and religions—are exposed to these new civilizational forces in mutually exclusive ways. Wanted or not, they are every nation’s and every person’s concern because they are structurally enmeshed with the new civilization process which I call ‘(reflexive) cosmopolitization’; and the civilizational condition thereby shared across the globe is ‘(reflexive or) second modernity’.

Cooperate or Fail!

Recent world history seems to dictate that surviving, let alone benefiting from, these new civilizational forces requires every nation to actively internalize them and one another. Again: the global other is in our midst!

Isolationist efforts—whether spoken of in terms of trade protectionism, religious fundamentalism, national fundamentalism, media and internet control or whatever else—are readily subjected to international moral condemnations (and, to some extent, ineffective). In fact, accepting or refusing these forces remains beyond willful political or social choices because they are globally reflexive—that is, compulsively occurring through the cosmopolitan imperative: cooperate or fail!

There is an increasing unease, nourished not least by the hesitant responses to the global financial crisis, the European currency crisis, and the poor results of the last global climate conference at Copenhagen in 2009, that these institutions are proving unable to address the challenges they were created to meet. Similar developments can be observed at the national level, regarding, for example, democratic institutions, welfare systems, families, and so forth. Can the World Bank solve the global problem of poverty? Can the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) solve a global food crisis? Can the World Trade Organization effectively regulate global trade? It seems as if these institutions do not constitute a sufficient basis for managing or controlling the global risks and crises created by the global victory of industrial capitalism.

Reflexivity and Normativity4

The age of cosmopolitization finally means that the great questions of life have to be addressed and understood—in opposition to the main trends in sociology and art, albeit from a novel point of view: in the distant other who is also very close we recognize ourselves.

Every epoch has its own epistemological and moral Sisyphus-questions: what is a ‘good life’? What is a ‘good government’? What goes towards making a ‘good society’, a ‘good family’ (a ‘good woman’, a ‘good man’, a ‘good child’, etc.)? All social and moral orders hitherto had, implicitly at least, answers befitting their own age or aspiring to universal validity. Reflexive cosmopolitization casts doubt on these claims in two ways: on the one hand, the regime of the Either/Or had traditionally set territorial limits to the contradictions of particular universalist claims to a ‘good life’, a ‘good society’, and a ‘good religion’ and in so doing, defused them. In the age of cosmopolitization, this world of clear distinctions and classifications now disappears. It follows that today in the everyday encounters between world religions the claims to universal validity of the two major cultures of Europe—the culture of Christianity and the culture of secular modernity—no longer hold water. The same may be said of the particularist universalist claims of other religions, such as Islamist universalism (‘Ummah’). Thus it is not just the case that religious differences become sources of conflict; over and above that, in the cosmopolitan constellation, we are witnessing the implosion of contextually defined universalisms and national and ethical certitudes along with them. Hence the outburst of neo-nationalism and the emergence of a democratic racism in the midst of societies everywhere.

On the other hand, a second consequence of this change is that we are witnessing the opening of a horizon in which new, existential Sisyphus questions become visible for which traditional social and political systems hold no answers. These questions concern the possibility of what Joshua J. Yates (2009) calls ‘the good world’, as the solution to a civilization at risk of self-destruction. They ask whether a modernity without limits (unlimited freedom, unlimited capitalism, unlimited research into human genetics, reproductive medicine, nanotechnology, etc.) needs ‘reflexive taboos’ (Beck/Sznaider 2011) to protect its most sacred values from itself. Is this the explanation for the absolutely unquenchable thirst for limits that is convulsing the global community?

This is exactly what the transformative dynamics of the second, cosmopolitan modernity is about! Isn’t there a gulf of centuries between the threats, opportunities and conflict dynamics of border-transcending, radicalized modernization in the twenty-first century and the ideas, institutions and structures of industrial capitalism and national state authority rooted in the nineteenth century?

It has become a commonplace that national institutions alone are unable to cope with the challenges of regulating global capitalism and responding to new global risks (Beck 1999, 2009). It is no less obvious that there is no global state or international organization capable of regulating global capital and risk in a way comparable to the role played by the European welfare national state in first modernity. In my Munich research centre (Institute for the Study of Reflexive Modernization), Edgar Grande in particular is concentrating on ‘risk regime’. There are platforms of cosmopolitan cooperation between representatives of transnational capital, national governments, global civil society groups and EU experts—trying to find answers to all kind of risk problems and conflicts which can later be implemented in national spaces. And, of course, regional powers become important: Cosmopolitan Europe (and maybe in the future a Cosmopolitan Asia, a Cosmopolitan South America, a Cosmopolitan Africa as well).

Re-mapping Social Inequality Beyond Methodological Nationalism

Studying the cosmopolitization of social inequality—and, indeed, across the globe inequalities seem to have increased—it is less clear that social class is the principal unit of analysis and investigation. I rather provocatively developed the argument that ‘social class’ is too soft a category to study social inequalities in the twenty-first century.

I developed three points here: first, the world of second modernity is a world of unbelievable contradictions and contrasts. There are ‘super modern castles’ or citadels constructed next to scenes of Apocalypse Now (as with the now destroyed World Trade Center in New York with thousands of beggars living in the subway below). Class hardly captures such shimmering inequality.

Second, the major movements of change have little to do with class, even that responsible for the most stunning transformation of the past three decades, such as the financial crisis of 2008, ‘9/11’ and the dramatic and unpredicted bringing down of the Soviet empire by various rights-based social networks.

Third, the national outlook on social inequality is inward orientated. It stops at the borders of the nation-state. Social inequalities may blossom and flourish on the other side of the national garden fence, which is, at best cause for moral outrage, but politically irrelevant.

A clear distinction must be made, therefore, between the reality of social inequality and the political problem of social inequality. National boundaries draw a sharp distinction between politically relevant and irrelevant inequality. Inequalities within national societies are enormously magnified in perception; at the same time inequalities between national societies are faded out. The ‘legitimation’ of global inequalities is based on an institutionalized ‘looking the other way’. The national gaze is ‘freed’ from looking at the misery of the world. It operates by way of a double exclusion: it excludes the excluded. And the social science of inequality, which equates inequality with nation-state inequality, is unreflectively party to that. It is indeed astonishing how firmly global inequalities are ‘legitimated’ on the basis of tacit agreement between nation-state government and nation-state sociology—a sociology programmed to work on a nation-state basis and claiming to be value-free!

My point is that while the performance principle legitimates national inequality, the nation-state principle legitimates global inequality (in another form). How? The inequalities between countries, regions and states are accounted politically incomparable. In a perspective bounded by the nation-state, politically relevant comparisons can only be played out within the nation-state, never between states. Such comparisons, which make inequality politically explosive, assume national norms of equality.

Paradox: even de-creasing global inequalities and in-creasing global norms of equality make global inequalities socially and politically explosive. Why? Because nation-state borders lose their function to legitimate global inequalities.

Yet that is precisely what the national gaze fades out: the more norms of equality spread worldwide, the more global inequality is stripped of the legitimation basis of institutionalized looking away. The wealthy democracies carry the banner of human rights to the furthest corners of the earth, without noticing that the national border defences, with which they want to repel the streams of migrants, thereby lose their legitimation. Many migrants take seriously the proclaimed human right of equality of mobility and encounter countries and states which—not least under the impact of increasing internal inequalities—want the norm of equality to stop short at their fortified borders. Put in other words, that means: the conception of social class, based on principles of nationality and statehood, misleads analysis. Most theorists of class, including Bourdieu (1984), who thought so extensively about globalization in his final years, identify class society with the nation-state. The same is true of Wallerstein (1974/1980/1989), Goldthorpe (2002) and, incidentally, also of my individualization thesis.

World Risk Society and Its Political Dynamics

Why is the concept of ‘(world) risk society’ so important in order to understand the social and political dynamics and transformations at the beginning of the twenty-first century? (Beck 2009). It is the accumulation of risks—ecological, financial, military, terrorist, biochemical and informational—that has an overwhelming presence in our world today. To the extent that risk is experienced as omnipresent, there are only three possible reactions: denial, apathy and transformation. The first is largely inscribed in modern culture, but ignores the political risk of denial; the second gives way to a nihilistic strain in postmodernism; the third marks the issue the theory on world risk society raises: how does the anticipation of a multiplicity of man-made futures and its risky consequences affect and transform the perceptions, living conditions and institutions of modern societies?

#### Double exclusion predetermines the parameters of violence we can conceptualize---attempts to filter out the 1AC are the ontological-cosmological commitments that denigrate and minimize life expression.

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How we relate to others should be a central concern of the field of International Relations. However, independent political communities—states—and their interrelations have historically been the focus of the discipline of International Relations (IR), thus limiting the forms of interaction that potentially constitute the field.[1] Postpositivist accounts have repeatedly indicated the disjuncture between the conceptual constructs that IR scholars use to make sense of the world historically and the way people practice their lives, which in the end is the substance of global politics. Many critical projects including Global IR have challenged the research produced through atomistic understandings of the world, and attempts have been made to integrate other ways of knowing into the discipline (Acharya 2014, Jackson and Nexon 1999, Tickner and Wæver 2009). While the ‘critical turn’ has made IR a more plural discipline by opening space for examining different types of relations, they have still been founded on modern, western ‘ontological’ assumptions about existence that have undercut their ability to reap the full benefits of other more robustly relational ways of existing (Blaney and Tickner 2017, Shani 2008, Trownsell 2013). Because the kind of plurality practised has not effectively dealt with distinctly relational ways of living and forms of knowing in their own terms, the call that we are making here is not just about adding other perspectives to the IR cauldron. We are aspiring for a deep plurality, in which IR scholars learn to effectively engage with difference at the ontological, methodological and practical levels.

Since the issue at hand is about ontological-cosmological commitments, we proffer our particular understandings of these terms. By ontology, we mean those basic assumptions about the nature of existence that are operative within any given tradition of living and thinking. In this sense ontology is closely linked to the cosmological in that they both reflect how we conceptualize our relationship with the cosmos and our place in it (Shani 2017). They are distinct in that cosmology refers more to origin stories and to cultural, spiritual and religious practices while ontology expresses the assumptions about the primordial condition of existence that provides the underlying logic of cosmological accounts and as such of all the other cultural fruits that emerge from them. Here we focus on ontology, because it helps draw attention to and provincialize many of the fundamental assumptions made in the dominant IR tradition, many of which have become invisible or merely commonsensical by being consonant with prevalent shared meaning systems and through longstanding and conventional use.

The general inability both in the field and discipline of international relations to recognize when and how one and others are engaging existence from very distinct ontological points of departure has had a serious impact in terms of both politics and knowledge production. Promoted through globally replicated institutions including academia, media, churches, etc., conceptualizing and practicing existence based on separation has become so naturalized that other more relational forms of being have been silenced and excluded. Conflict over what counts as real arises since those applying the predominant assumptions cannot even fathom that these other ways of being can be possible, legitimate or valid. As such living in one’s own or a group’s terms becomes a struggle when they are not aligned with the more predominant logic.

Several consequences of being blind to these relational ways of living and being manifest themselves politically. First these life expressions are often “othered” and “minimized” by treating them as myths (Law 2015), legends, superstitions, or stories about how people communicate with other beings. Denigration also becomes evident when examining public policies that do not even articulate, let alone protect, these relational ways of life. Among humans, groups abound that have not been deemed worthy of civil rights protections in the process of statebuilding for not engaging the world in sufficiently “civilized” manners (Sawyer 2004). Others have been the targets of state-led violence through national forced sterilization or “population control” initiatives (Carpio 2004, Pegoraro 2015). Beyond the human, these excluded groups have clamored to protect other beings that do not translate easily into traditional legal frameworks. For example, while indigenous groups were able to get the rights of nature officially acknowledged in Ecuador’s 2008 constitution, an effective implementation of these rights has yet to be seen. Efforts to maintain a healthy relationship with the beings of land, water, air, plants and animals often come into direct conflict with “national interests,” international treaties, foreign direct investment and forms of international cooperation, as can be clearly seen in last year’s indigenous struggles at Standing Rock in the United States. In the end, the ontological nature of these clashes has been clearly echoed in the zapatistas’ claims to a world of many worlds when stating, “We are another resistance, we are another reality.”[2]

In addition to the important political implications in the field of international relations, the discipline itself has yet to consider seriously relational ways of knowing and being. Because the problematics typical of IR and the tools generated to deal with them have been identified and named through the same predominant set of existential assumptions, the conceptual capacity of the discipline to grasp and respond to these ways of knowing is limited. In fact the predominant understanding of ontology within the discipline of IR has been referred to as “scientific ontology” (Patomäki and Wight 2000, Jackson 2011). Here scholars fight over what exists in the world without a prior discussion as to how it is ontologically that we arrive at a place where we insist on the existential autonomy of categories in the first place. This means that we keep studying these cosmologies through ontologically incommensurate filters (not based on similar existential assumptions) thinking that in this way we will still be able to understand them and then use the knowledge generated through reduced filters to find effective strategies for engagement. Yet our ontological parochialism still translates into epistemic violence by not being able to hear, understand, engage their world in their own ontological terms. Simultaneously we continue to generate a skewed picture of the kinds of knowing and being practiced in distinct parts of the world and subsequently of world politics. Consequently the resulting “intelligibility gap” still reinforces certain ways of being and knowing in the world as more legitimate or acceptable than others, thus reinforcing the source of cosmological insecurity for those falling outside these parameters.

#### The only just response is post-Westphalian---the “who” of justice determines what we consider crisis and response. Meta-injustice through frame setting determines who has the right to have rights.

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Globalization is changing the way we argue about justice.footnote1 Not so long ago, in the heyday of social democracy, disputes about justice presumed what I shall call a ‘Keynesian-Westphalian frame’. Typically played out within modern territorial states, arguments about justice were assumed to concern relations among fellow citizens, to be subject to debate within national publics, and to contemplate redress by national states. This was true for each of two major families of justice claims—claims for socioeconomic redistribution and claims for legal or cultural recognition. At a time when the Bretton Woods system facilitated Keynesian economic steering at the national level, claims for redistribution usually focused on economic inequities within territorial states. Appealing to national public opinion for a fair share of the national pie, claimants sought intervention by national states in national economies. Likewise, in an era still gripped by a Westphalian political imaginary, which sharply distinguished ‘domestic’ from ‘international’ space, claims for recognition generally concerned internal status hierarchies. Appealing to the national conscience for an end to nationally institutionalized disrespect, claimants pressed national governments to outlaw discrimination and accommodate differences among citizens. In both cases, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame was taken for granted. Whether the matter concerned redistribution or recognition, class differentials or status hierarchies, it went without saying that the unit within which justice applied was the modern territorial state.footnote2

To be sure, there were always exceptions. Occasionally, famines and genocides galvanized public opinion across borders. And some cosmopolitans and anti-imperialists sought to promulgate globalist views.footnote3 But these were exceptions that proved the rule. Relegated to the sphere of ‘the international’, they were subsumed within a problematic that was focused primarily on matters of security, as opposed to justice. The effect was to reinforce, rather than to challenge, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame. That framing of disputes about justice generally prevailed by default from the end of the Second World War to the 1970s.

Although it went unnoticed at the time, this framework lent a distinctive shape to arguments about social justice. Taking for granted the modern territorial state as the appropriate unit, and its citizens as the pertinent subjects, such arguments turned on what precisely those citizens owed one another. In the eyes of some, it sufficed that citizens be formally equal before the law; for others, equality of opportunity was also required; for still others, justice demanded that all citizens gain access to the resources and respect they needed in order to be able to participate on a par with others, as full members of the political community. The argument focused, in other words, on exactly what should count as a just ordering of social relations within a society. Engrossed in disputing the ‘what’ of justice, the contestants apparently felt no necessity to dispute the ‘who’. With the Keynesian-Westphalian frame securely in place, it went without saying that the ‘who’ was the national citizenry.

Today, however, this framework is losing its aura of self-evidence. Thanks to heightened awareness of globalization, and to post-Cold War geopolitical instabilities, many observe that the social processes shaping their lives routinely overflow territorial borders. They note, for example, that decisions taken in one territorial state often have an impact on the lives of those outside it, as do the actions of transnational corporations, international currency speculators, and large institutional investors. Many also note the growing salience of supranational and international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, and of transnational public opinion, which flows with supreme disregard for borders through global mass media and cybertechnology. The result is a new sense of vulnerability to transnational forces. Faced with global warming, the spread of aids, international terrorism and superpower unilateralism, many believe that their chances for living good lives depend at least as much on processes that trespass the borders of territorial states as on those contained within them.

Under these conditions, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame no longer goes without saying. For many, it has ceased to be axiomatic that the modern territorial state is the appropriate unit for thinking about issues of justice, and that the citizens of such states are the pertinent subjects of reference. The effect is to destabilize the previous structure of political claims-making—and therefore to change the way we argue about social justice.

This is true for both major families of justice claims. In today’s world, claims for redistribution increasingly eschew the assumption of national economies. Faced with transnationalized production, the outsourcing of jobs, and the associated pressures of the ‘race to the bottom’, once nationally focused labour unions look increasingly for allies abroad. Inspired by the Zapatistas, meanwhile, impoverished peasants and indigenous peoples link their struggles against despotic local and national authorities to critiques of transnational corporate predation and global neoliberalism. Finally, wto protestors directly target the new governance structures of the global economy, which have vastly strengthened the ability of large corporations and investors to escape the regulatory and taxation powers of territorial states.

In the same way, movements struggling for recognition increasingly look beyond the territorial state. Under the umbrella slogan ‘women’s rights are human rights’, for example, feminists throughout the world are linking struggles against local patriarchal practices to campaigns to reform international law. Meanwhile, religious and ethnic minorities, who face discrimination within territorial states, are reconstituting themselves as diasporas and building transnational publics from which to mobilize international opinion. Finally, transnational coalitions of human-rights activists are seeking to build new cosmopolitan institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, which can punish state violations of human dignity.

In such cases, disputes about justice are exploding the Keynesian-Westphalian frame. No longer addressed exclusively to national states or debated exclusively by national publics, claimants no longer focus solely on relations among fellow citizens. Thus, the grammar of argument has altered. Whether the issue is distribution or recognition, disputes that used to focus exclusively on the question of what is owed as a matter of justice to community members now turn quickly into disputes about who should count as a member and which is the relevant community. Not just the ‘what’ but also the ‘who’ is up for grabs.

Today, in other words, arguments about justice assume a double guise. On the one hand, they concern first-order questions of substance, just as before. How much economic inequality does justice permit, how much redistribution is required, and according to which principle of distributive justice? What constitutes equal respect, which kinds of differences merit public recognition, and by which means? But above and beyond such first-order questions, arguments about justice today also concern second-order, meta-level questions. What is the proper frame within which to consider first-order questions of justice? Who are the relevant subjects entitled to a just distribution or reciprocal recognition in the given case? Thus, it is not only the substance of justice, but also the frame, which is in dispute. The result is a major challenge to our theories of social justice. Preoccupied largely with first-order issues of distribution and/or recognition, these theories have so far failed to develop conceptual resources for reflecting on the meta-issue of the frame. As things stand, therefore, it is by no means clear that they are capable of addressing the double character of problems of justice in a globalizing age.footnote4

In this essay, I shall propose a strategy for thinking about the problem of the frame. I shall argue, first, that theories of justice must become three-dimensional, incorporating the political dimension of representation alongside the economic dimension of distribution and the cultural dimension of recognition. I shall also argue that the political dimension of representation should itself be understood as encompassing three levels. The combined effect of these two arguments will be to make visible a third question, beyond those of the ‘what’ and the ‘who’, which I shall call the question of the ‘how’. That question, in turn, inaugurates a paradigm shift: what the Keynesian-Westphalian frame cast as the theory of social justice must now become a theory of post-Westphalian democratic justice.

Specificity of the political

Let me begin by explaining what I mean by justice in general and by its political dimension in particular. In my view, the most general meaning of justice is parity of participation. According to this radical-democratic interpretation of the principle of equal moral worth, justice requires social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life. Overcoming injustice means dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some people from participating on a par with others, as full partners in social interaction. Previously, I have analysed two distinct kinds of obstacles to participatory parity, which correspond to two distinct species of injustice. On the one hand, people can be impeded from full participation by economic structures that deny them the resources they need in order to interact with others as peers; in that case they suffer from distributive injustice or maldistribution. On the other hand, people can also be prevented from interacting on terms of parity by institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing; in that case they suffer from status inequality or misrecognition.footnote5 In the first case, the problem is the class structure of society, which corresponds to the economic dimension of justice. In the second case, the problem is the status order, which corresponds to its cultural dimension. In modern capitalist societies, the class structure and the status order do not neatly mirror each other, although they interact causally. Rather, each has some autonomy vis-à-vis the other. As a result, misrecognition cannot be reduced to a secondary effect of maldistribution, as some economistic theories of distributive justice appear to suppose. Nor, conversely, can maldistribution be reduced to an epiphenomenal expression of misrecognition, as some culturalist theories of recognition tend to assume. Thus, neither recognition theory nor distribution theory alone can provide an adequate understanding of justice for capitalist society. Only a two-dimensional theory, encompassing both distribution and recognition, can supply the necessary levels of social-theoretical complexity and moral-philosophical insight.footnote6

That, at least, is the view of justice I have defended in the past. And this two-dimensional understanding of justice still seems right to me as far as it goes. But I now believe that it does not go far enough. Distribution and recognition could appear to constitute the sole dimensions of justice only so long as the Keynesian-Westphalian frame was taken for granted. Once the question of the frame becomes subject to contestation, the effect is to make visible a third dimension of justice, which was neglected in my previous work—as well as in the work of many other philosophers.footnote7

The third dimension of justice is the political. Of course, distribution and recognition are themselves political in the sense of being contested and power-laden; and they have usually been seen as requiring adjudication by the state. But I mean political in a more specific, constitutive sense, which concerns the nature of the state’s jurisdiction and the decision rules by which it structures contestation. The political in this sense furnishes the stage on which struggles over distribution and recognition are played out. Establishing criteria of social belonging, and thus determining who counts as a member, the political dimension of justice specifies the reach of those other dimensions: it tells us who is included in, and who excluded from, the circle of those entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition. Establishing decision rules, the political dimension likewise sets the procedures for staging and resolving contests in both the economic and the cultural dimensions: it tells us not only who can make claims for redistribution and recognition, but also how such claims are to be mooted and adjudicated.

Centred on issues of membership and procedure, the political dimension of justice is concerned chiefly with representation. At one level, which pertains to the boundary-setting aspect of the political, representation is a matter of social belonging. What is at issue here is inclusion in, or exclusion from, the community of those entitled to make justice claims on one another. At another level, which pertains to the decision-rule aspect, representation concerns the procedures that structure public processes of contestation. Here, what is at issue are the terms on which those included in the political community air their claims and adjudicate their disputes.footnote8 At both levels, the question can arise as to whether the relations of representation are just. One can ask: do the boundaries of the political community wrongly exclude some who are actually entitled to representation? Do the community’s decision rules accord equal voice in public deliberations and fair representation in public decision-making to all members? Such issues of representation are specifically political. Conceptually distinct from both economic and cultural questions, they cannot be reduced to the latter, although, as we shall see, they are inextricably interwoven with them.

To say that the political is a conceptually distinct dimension of justice, not reducible to the economic or the cultural, is also to say that it can give rise to a conceptually distinct species of injustice. Given the view of justice as participatory parity, this means that there can be distinctively political obstacles to parity, not reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition, although (again) interwoven with them. Such obstacles arise from the political constitution of society, as opposed to the class structure or status order. Grounded in a specifically political mode of social ordering, they can only be adequately grasped through a theory that conceptualizes representation, along with distribution and recognition, as one of three fundamental dimensions of justice.

Three levels of misrepresentation

If representation is the defining issue of the political, then the characteristic political injustice is misrepresentation. Misrepresentation occurs when political boundaries and/or decision rules function to deny some people, wrongly, the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction—including, but not only, in political arenas. Far from being reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition, misrepresentation can occur even in the absence of the latter injustices, although it is usually intertwined with them. At least two different levels of misrepresentation can be distinguished. Insofar as political decision rules wrongly deny some of the included the chance to participate fully, as peers, the injustice is what I call ordinary-political misrepresentation. Here, where the issue is intra-frame representation, we enter the familiar terrain of political science debates over the relative merits of alternative electoral systems. Do single-member-district, winner-take-all, first-past-the-post systems unjustly deny parity to numerical minorities? And if so, is proportional representation or cumulative voting the appropriate remedy? Likewise, do gender-blind rules, in conjunction with gender-based maldistribution and misrecognition, function to deny parity of political participation to women? And if so, are gender quotas an appropriate remedy? Such questions belong to the sphere of ordinary-political justice, which has usually been played out within the Keynesian-Westphalian frame.

Less obvious, perhaps, is a second level of misrepresentation, which concerns the boundary-setting aspect of the political. Here the injustice arises when the community’s boundaries are drawn in such a way as to wrongly exclude some people from the chance to participate at all in its authorized contests over justice. In such cases, misrepresentation takes a deeper form, which I shall call misframing. The deeper character of misframing is a function of the crucial importance of framing to every question of social justice. Far from being of marginal significance, frame-setting is among the most consequential of political decisions. Constituting both members and non-members in a single stroke, this decision effectively excludes the latter from the universe of those entitled to consideration within the community in matters of distribution, recognition, and ordinary-political representation. The result can be a serious injustice. When questions of justice are framed in a way that wrongly excludes some from consideration, the consequence is a special kind of meta-injustice, in which one is denied the chance to press first-order justice claims in a given political community. The injustice remains, moreover, even when those excluded from one political community are included as subjects of justice in another—as long as the effect of the political division is to put some relevant aspects of justice beyond their reach. Still more serious, of course, is the case in which one is excluded from membership in any political community. Akin to the loss of what Hannah Arendt called ‘the right to have rights’, that sort of misframing is a kind of ‘political death’.footnote9 Those who suffer it may become objects of charity or benevolence. But deprived of the possibility of authoring first-order claims, they become non-persons with respect to justice.

It is the misframing form of misrepresentation that globalization has recently begun to make visible. Earlier, in the heyday of the postwar welfare state, with the Keynesian-Westphalian frame securely in place, the principal concern in thinking about justice was distribution. Later, with the rise of the new social movements and multiculturalism, the centre of gravity shifted to recognition. In both cases, the modern territorial state was assumed by default. As a result, the political dimension of justice was relegated to the margins. Where it did emerge, it took the ordinary-political form of contests over the decision rules internal to the polity, whose boundaries were taken for granted. Thus, claims for gender quotas and multicultural rights sought to remove political obstacles to participatory parity for those who were already included in principle in the political community. Taking for granted the Keynesian-Westphalian frame, they did not call into question the assumption that the appropriate unit of justice was the territorial state.

Today, in contrast, globalization has put the question of the frame squarely on the political agenda. Increasingly subject to contestation, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is now considered by many to be a major vehicle of injustice, as it partitions political space in ways that block many who are poor and despised from challenging the forces that oppress them. Channelling their claims into the domestic political spaces of relatively powerless, if not wholly failed, states, this frame insulates offshore powers from critique and control.footnote10 Among those shielded from the reach of justice are more powerful predator states and transnational private powers, including foreign investors and creditors, international currency speculators, and transnational corporations. Also protected are the governance structures of the global economy, which set exploitative terms of interaction and then exempt them from democratic control. Finally, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is self-insulating; the architecture of the interstate system protects the very partitioning of political space that it institutionalizes, effectively excluding transnational democratic decision-making on issues of justice.

From this perspective, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is a powerful instrument of injustice, which gerrymanders political space at the expense of the poor and despised. For those persons who are denied the chance to press transnational first-order claims, struggles against maldistribution and misrecognition cannot proceed, let alone succeed, unless they are joined with struggles against misframing. It is not surprising, therefore, that some consider misframing the defining injustice of a globalizing age. Under these conditions, the political dimension of justice is hard to ignore. Insofar as globalization is politicizing the question of the frame, it is also making visible an aspect of the grammar of justice that was often neglected in the previous period. It is now apparent that no claim for justice can avoid presupposing some notion of representation, implicit or explicit, insofar as none can avoid assuming a frame. Thus, representation is always already inherent in all claims for redistribution and recognition. The political dimension is implicit in, indeed required by, the grammar of the concept of justice. Thus, no redistribution or recognition without representation.footnote11

In general, then, an adequate theory of justice for our time must be three-dimensional. Encompassing not only redistribution and recognition, but also representation, it must allow us to grasp the question of the frame as a question of justice. Incorporating the economic, cultural and political dimensions, it must enable us to identify injustices of misframing and to evaluate possible remedies. Above all, it must permit us to pose, and to answer, the key political question of our age: how can we integrate struggles against maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation within a post-Westphalian frame?

#### Our contestation of the “who” of politics is open cosmopolitanism. Think transnational, crisscrossed networks of anti-nationalist, open public spheres that reimagine just, desirable futures---bottom up, agile movements can address global crisis by resisting hegemonic lifeworlds of competition.

Giuseppe Caruso 17. “Open Cosmopolitanism and the World Social Forum: Global Resistance, Emancipation, and the Activists’ Vision of a Better World.” Globalizations, 14:4, 504-518, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2016.1254413

The resurgence over the past three decades of a cosmopolitan discourse is related to, on the one hand, the expansion of market-led globalisation and, on the other, the intensification of social and political mobilisation for social justice. The fall of the Berlin Wall introduced a vision of global unity predicated on the global spread of neo-liberal doctrines. Liberalisation, privatisation, and devolution fostered by global governance institutions—the World Bank, IMF, and WTO—affected the global dynamics of production, trade, and governance. Concurrently, a global culture began to develop carried by waves of consumer goods and by the flooding of the global airwaves (and fibre optics) with entertainment products which established or reinforced global cultural stereotypes and entrenched values of competition, individualism, and consumerism. Narratives about the survival of the fittest increasingly express human relationships and social arrangements

As neo-liberalism was hailed by conservative elites as the panacea to social problems and the engine of global development, its dark side was increasingly resisted in protests around the world targeting labour market deregulation, environmental degradation, poverty, inequality, and exploitation. Localised forms of resistance grew in scale with the intensification of electronic communication between activists. In 1999, weaving networks that criss-crossed the planet, an unprecedented activist convergence burst into the public scene in the Seattle mobilisation against the WTO. The critical mass achieved in Seattle moved in waves to successive demonstrations such as those against the World Bank and the IMF in Prague in 2000 or the G8 in Genoa in 2001 (Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, & Reiter, 2006; Pleyers, 2010; Smith, Byrd, Reese, & Smythe, 2011). In January 2001, the first World Social Forum (WSF) took place in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Conway, 2013; Juris, 2008a; Teivainen, in press). Grown out of the alterglobalisation movement and shaped by Brazilian activists, WSF’s more recent roots lay in the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, peace, and pro-democracy movements since the 1960s and in the alternative NGO forums to the UN conferences of the 1990s (Correa Leite, 2003; Fisher & Ponniah, 2003; Glasius, 2005; Seoane & Taddei, 2002; Wallerstein, 2004; Waterman, 2004).

The WSF is the world’s largest and most diverse transnational activist initiative to date. Its global events in Brazil, India, Kenya, Mali, Pakistan, Venezuela, Senegal, Tunisia, and Canada, and the dozens of regional, national, and local avatars have gathered millions of participants and tens of thousands of civil society organisations and social movements (Massiah, 2011).1 The WSF was developed as a counter-event to the World Economic Forum (WEF), a gathering of the world’s wealthiest CEOs and most influential finance ministers, heads of government, and academics. Its meetings focus on market expansion and economic development. WSF’s activists, instead, stress social and environmental justice when imagining desirable futures. They privilege equity over individual wealth, harmony with over exploitation of the environment, and shared responsibility over profit. The WSF has been described as a global public sphere (Conway & Singh, 2009; Doerr, 2008; Glasius, 2005; Hardt, 2002), a global network of social movements (Byrd & Jasny, 2010; Juris, 2008a; Waterman, 2004), a utopian space (Tormey, 2005), a space of intentionality (Juris, 2008b), an embryonic party (ChaseDunn & Reese, 2007; Marcuse, 2005; Patomaki & Teivainen, 2004), or a contact zone (Conway, 2011) in which alliances develop transversally (Housseini, 2013) across multiple political cleavages (Santos, 2004).

WSF’s most inspiring political and organisational innovation has been the ‘open space’. The open space, a bottom-up and participatory methodology for social change, provides a context for the creation of knowledge and experience beyond a directive pursuit of change (Whitaker, 2005). This formula rallied unprecedented numbers of activists from very diverse backgrounds. The open space is the organisational representation of the political environment in which WSF’s open cosmopolitanism takes shape. WSF’s unique cosmopolitan vision is developed both as resistance against neo-liberal cosmopolitanism and as a methodology of individual and collective emancipation. The nature of WSF’s cosmopolitan aspiration has been discussed by Janet Conway and Boaventura de Souza Santos. Scholars familiar with the WSF, they framed WSF’s cosmopolitanism as decolonial (Conway 2011, 2013) 2 and subaltern (Santos, 2004, 2005a). Dialogue (Conway, 2012) and translation (Santos, 2005b) are among the strategies deployed to develop WSF’s field and to extend its reach across world society. The two authors differ in the understandings of the tensions and conflicts in the WSF. Santos sees the cleavages traversing the WSF as a guarantee of openness against the domination of one ideological and organisational form. Conway warns about power dynamics among WSF participants and points at the contradictions of a space in which structures of domination not only are not challenged, but through denial are also in fact strengthened.

WSF’s open cosmopolitanism, I argue, invokes a struggle for global justice built on dissent and resistance, driven by emancipatory aspirations, and fuelled by a global alliance against neo-liberal globalisation: dissent against any totalitarianism that denies social complexities, that attempts to subsume them forcefully, or that attempts to annihilate them; resistance against hegemonic lifeworlds; emancipatory because it is predicated on individuals’ and groups’ self-determination. In previous examinations, I have described the WSF in terms of ‘emancipatory cosmopolitanism’ (2012b) and ‘open cosmopolitanism’ (2012a). Here, I consider the latter as a recursive process of power and resistance, conflict and emancipation taking place both across and within the boundaries of WSF’s open space. Open cosmopolitanism understands that denied conflict between allies reinforces dynamics of domination and that courageous engagements of those conflicts, however painful and apparently destabilising of activists’ contingent goals, promote trust and, potentially, effectiveness (Caruso, 2004).

Open cosmopolitanism is not based on a blueprint, it develops in fits and starts, it is traversed by powerful ambivalences, it often suffers setbacks, and its outcomes are not foreseeable and are always open to reframing and reinterpretation as the activists’ work develops into new and previously unimaginable forms. Power dynamics, ideological cleavages, and pragmatic concerns about organisation, alliance building, and strategic efficacy traverse the open space and, according to some, challenge WSF’s ability to pursue its goals (Worth & Buckley, 2009; Zibechi, 2012). Criticism centred on the extent to which the excitement that the WSF generated among activists may be justified; on the gap between values and practices in the open space; on the disappointment generated by the unrealistic investments in the possibility for global social change afforded by the WSF; and, more recently, on the ability of the WSF to adapt to a changed political environment. Tensions, internal struggles, and critical analysis, I argue, contribute to make WSF’s cosmopolitan project, though apparently harder to achieve, more realistic (but by no means easier) than statements of universal solidarity among global activists or, even more, among all human beings united in a common destiny on a shared planet. When acknowledged and worked through, conflicts and power dynamics contribute to the recursive nature of the struggle for individual and collective emancipation. As conflicts are engaged and negotiated and as the ambivalent nature of human existence is made central to groups’ organisation, resistance to domination becomes the ground on which the alternative is constructed and emancipation can realistically be achieved. WSF’s open cosmopolitanism is here understood as the struggle between Empire and Cosmopolis as discussed by Gills (2005). This struggle is not only represented by the opposition of WSF’s Cosmopolis to the WEF’s Empire, but also, more broadly, as the struggle between two contending visions of human existence and global community. With Gills, I understand these contending visions as the expression of a ‘perennial historical tension, [which is] deeply embedded in history and human psyche’ (2005, p. 5). I have been involved in the WSF since 2002. The present article is based on material collected during participant observation in four continents complemented by extensive virtual ethnography and unstructured interviews.3 The remainder of this article is organised as follows. The next section discusses WSF’s founding cosmopolitan principles. The following introduces WSF’s cosmopolitan practices. Section 4 discusses conflict in the open space. Section 5 spells out WSF’s open cosmopolitanism. Section 6 concludes.

#### Combating injustice requires reclaiming democracy by creating new arenas to contest the who and how of politics.

Nancy Fraser 05. Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School. “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World, NLR 36, November–December 2005.” New Left Review. https://newleftreview-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/issues/ii36/articles/nancy-fraser-reframing-justice-in-a-globalizing-world

But the claims of transformative politics go further still. Above and beyond their other demands, these movements are also claiming a say in a post-Westphalian process of frame-setting. Rejecting the standard view, which deems frame-setting the prerogative of states and transnational elites, they are effectively aiming to democratize the process by which the frameworks of justice are drawn and revised. Asserting their right to participate in constituting the ‘who’ of justice, they are simultaneously transforming the ‘how’—by which I mean the accepted procedures for determining the ‘who’. At their most reflective and ambitious, accordingly, transformative movements are demanding the creation of new democratic arenas for entertaining arguments about the frame. In some cases, moreover, they are creating such arenas themselves. In the World Social Forum, for example, some practitioners of transformative politics have fashioned a transnational public sphere where they can participate on a par with others in airing and resolving disputes about the frame. In this way, they are prefiguring the possibility of new institutions of post-Westphalian democratic justice.footnote16

The democratizing dimension of transformative politics points to a third level of political injustice, above and beyond the two already discussed. Previously, I distinguished first-order injustices of ordinary-political misrepresentation from second-order injustices of misframing. Now, however, we can discern a third-order species of political injustice, which corresponds to the question of the ‘how’. Exemplified by undemocratic processes of frame-setting, this injustice consists in the failure to institutionalize parity of participation at the meta-political level, in deliberations and decisions concerning the ‘who’. Because what is at stake here is the process by which first-order political space is constituted, I shall call this injustice meta-political misrepresentation. Meta-political misrepresentation arises when states and transnational elites monopolize the activity of frame-setting, denying voice to those who may be harmed in the process, and blocking creation of democratic arenas where the latter’s claims can be vetted and redressed. The effect is to exclude the overwhelming majority of people from participation in the meta-discourses that determine the authoritative division of political space. Lacking any institutional arenas for such participation, and submitted to an undemocratic approach to the ‘how’, the majority is denied the chance to engage on terms of parity in decision-making about the ‘who’.

#### Open cosmopolitanism is a process, not a blueprint---the struggle, even if imperfect, is resistance.

Giuseppe Caruso 17. “Open Cosmopolitanism and the World Social Forum: Global Resistance, Emancipation, and the Activists’ Vision of a Better World.” Globalizations, 14:4, 504-518, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2016.1254413

Open cosmopolitanism represents WSF’s end, its journey, and its mode of travel. Both aspirations and realisations develop through recursive conflicts between multiple instantiations, historical and psychological, of Empire and Cosmopolis. Open cosmopolitanism is not based on blueprints. It is a work in process, impossible to uniquely define. Open cosmopolitanism invokes a recursive process of emancipation. It is about freeing, just as much as it is about freedom. It is about opening, just as much as it is about openness. It is not built on the assumption of universality, but on continued struggles to confront the conflicts that traverse global society. The following passage illustrates WSF’s conception of resistance and alternatives as one:

To imagine that another world is possible is a creative act to make it possible. The WSF releases contradictions and makes them operate, catalyzing, liberating creative energies. [ ... ] The WSF intends to be a space to facilitate pulling together and strengthening an international coalition of the most diverse social movements and organizations, adhering to the principle of respect for differences, autonomy of ideas, and forms of struggle. [ ... ] It’s an initiative of the emerging planetary civil society. [ ... ] It’s a movement of ideas that feeds on human diversity and possibilities, opposing the ‘single way of thinking’. [ ... ] The WSF is a living laboratory for world citizenship. (WSF, 2003, original italics)

Resistance and experimentation gather energy from recursive processes of individual and collective emancipation taking place across multiple conflicts both within and without WSF’s open space. This also explains the emergent nature and the mutually constitutive relationship between WSF’s cosmopolitan imaginations, practices of resistance, and new solidarities. Justice, equality, self- and collective realisation, mutual recognition, and radical democracy are, at the same time, methodologies and objectives of WSF’s open cosmopolitanism. The multiple paths it explores are traced by the prevalence of collective work over basic assumptions of ‘equality in the struggle’ and are grounded on values supporting creative thinking: curiosity, empathy, and solidarity.

#### We need new research agendas. Political and social theory must be redefined.

Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider 10. Ulrich Beck. Department of Sociology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munich. Natan Sznaider, School of Behavioral Sciences, Academic College of Tel-Aviv Yaffo, Israel. "Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda". Wiley Online Library. 1-15-2010. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2009.01250.x

Indeed, the basic idea behind this special issue of the British Journal of Sociology is that ‘the light of the great cultural problems has moved on’ from a nation-state definition of society and politics to a cosmopolitan outlook. At this point the humanities and social sciences need to get ready for a transformation of their own positions and conceptual equipment – that is, to take cosmopolitanism as a research agenda seriously and raise some of the key conceptual, methodological, empirical and normative issues that the cosmopolitanization of reality poses for the social sciences. The intellectual undertaking of redefining cosmopolitanism is a trans-disciplinary one, which includes geography, anthropology, ethnology, international relations, international law, political philosophy and political theory, and now sociology and social theory (see Beck and Sznaider 2006). Cosmopolitanism is, of course, a contested term; there is no uniform interpretation of it in the growing literature. The boundaries separating it from competitive terms like globalization, transnationalism, universalism, glocalization etc. are not distinct and internally it is traversed by all kind of fault lines. Yet we will argue that the neo-cosmopolitanism in the social sciences –‘realistic cosmopolitanism’ or ‘cosmopolitan realism’– is an identifiable intellectual movement united by at least three interconnected commitments:

First, the shared critique of methodological nationalism which blinds conventional sociology to the multi-dimensional process of change that has irreversibly transformed the very nature of the social world and the place of states within that world. Methodological nationalism does not mean (as the term ‘methodological individualism’ suggests) that one or many sociologists have consciously created an explicit methodology (theory) based on an explicit nationalism. The argument rather goes that social scientists in doing research or theorizing take it for granted that society is equated with national society, as Durkheim does when he reflects on the integration of society. He, of course, has in mind the integration of the national society (France) without even mentioning, naming or thinking about it. In fact, not using the adjective ‘national’ as a universal language does not falsify but might sometimes even prove methodological nationalism. That is the case when the practice of the argument or the research presupposes that the unit of analysis is the national society or the national state or the combination of both. The concept of methodological nationalism is not a concept of methodology but of the sociology of sociology or the sociology of social theory.

Second, the shared diagnosis that the twenty-first century is becoming an age of cosmopolitanism. This could and should be compared with other historical moments of cosmopolitanism, such as those in ancient Greece, the Alexandrian empire and the Enlightenment. In the 1960s Hannah Arendt analysed the Human Condition, in the 1970s Francois Lyotard the Postmodern Condition. Now at the beginning of the twenty-first century we have to discover, map and understand the Cosmopolitan Condition.

Third, there is a shared assumption that for this purpose we need some kind of ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’. Of course, there is a lot of controversy about what this means. The main point for us lies in the fact that the dualities of the global and the local, the national and the international, us and them, have dissolved and merged together in new forms that require conceptual and empirical analysis. The outcome of this is that the concept and phenomena of cosmopolitanism are not spatially fixed; the term itself is not tied to the ‘cosmos’ or the ‘globe’, and it certainly does not encompass ‘everything’. The principle of cosmopolitanism can be found in specific forms at every level and can be practiced in every field of social and political action: in international organizations, in bi-national families, in neighbourhoods, in global cities, in transnationalized military organizations, in the management of multi-national co-operations, in production networks, human rights organizations, among ecology activists and the paradoxical global opposition to globalization.

Critique of methodological nationalism

Methodological nationalism takes the following premises for granted: it equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their governments as the primary focus of social-scientific analysis. It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states and externally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. And it goes further: this outer delimitation as well as the competition between nation-states, represent the most fundamental category of political organization.

The premises of the social sciences assume the collapse of social boundaries with state boundaries, believing that social action occurs primarily within and only secondarily across, these divisions:

[Like] stamp collecting . . . social scientists collected distinctive national social forms. Japanese industrial relations, German national character, the American constitution, the British class system – not to mention the more exotic institutions of tribal societies – were the currency of social research. The core disciplines of the social sciences, whose intellectual traditions are reference points for each other and for other fields, were therefore domesticated– in the sense of being preoccupied not with Western and world civilization as wholes but with the ‘domestic’ forms of particular national societies (Shaw 2000: 68).

The critique of methodological nationalism should not be confused with the thesis that the end of the nation-state has arrived. One does not criticize methodological individualism by proclaiming the end of the individual. Nation-states (as all the research shows – see also the different contributions in this volume) will continue to thrive or will be transformed into transnational states. What, then, is the main point of the critique of methodological nationalism? It adopts categories of practice as categories of analysis. The decisive point is that national organization as a structuring principle of societal and political action can no longer serve as the orienting reference point for the social scientific observer. One cannot even understand the re-nationalization or re-ethnification trend in Western or Eastern Europe without a cosmopolitan perspective. In this sense, the social sciences can only respond adequately to the challenge of globalization if they manage to overcome methodological nationalism and to raise empirically and theoretically fundamental questions within specialized fields of research, and thereby elaborate the foundations of a newly formulated cosmopolitan social science.

As many authors – including the ones in this volume – criticize, in the growing discourse on cosmopolitanism there is a danger of fusing the ideal with the real. What cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately be separated from what cosmopolitanism should be. But the same is true of nationalism. The small, but important, difference is that in the case of nationalism the value judgment of the social scientists goes unnoticed because methodological nationalism includes a naturalized conception of nations as real communities. In the case of the cosmopolitan ‘Wertbeziehung’ (Max Weber, value relation), by contrast, this silent commitment to a nation-state centred outlook of sociology appears problematic.

In order to unpack the argument in the two cases it is necessary to distinguish between the actor perspective and the observer perspective. From this it follows that a sharp distinction should be made between methodological and normative nationalism. The former is linked to the social-scientific observer perspective, whereas the latter refers to the negotiation perspectives of political actors. In a normative sense, nationalism means that every nation has the right to self-determination within the context of its cultural, political and even geographical boundaries and distinctiveness. Methodological nationalism assumes this normative claim as a socio-ontological given and simultaneously links it to the most important conflict and organization orientations of society and politics. These basic tenets have become the main perceptual grid of the social sciences. Indeed, this social-scientific stance is part of the nation-state's own self-understanding. A national view on society and politics, law, justice, memory and history governs the sociological imagination. To some extent, much of the social sciences has become a prisoner of the nation-state. That this was not always the case is shown in Bryan Turner's paper in this issue (Turner 2006: 133–51). This does not mean, of course, that a cosmopolitan social science can and should ignore different national traditions of law, history, politics and memory. These traditions exist and become part of our cosmopolitan methodology. The comparative analyses of societies, international relations, political theory, and a significant part of history and law all essentially function on the basis of methodological nationalism. This is valid to the extent that the majority of positions in the contemporary debates in social and political science over globalization can be systematically interpreted as transdisciplinary reflexes linked to methodological nationalism.

These premises also structure empirical research, for example, in the choice of statistical indicators, which are almost always exclusively national. A refutation of methodological nationalism from a strictly empirical viewpoint is therefore difficult, indeed, almost impossible, because so many statistical categories and research procedures are based on it. It is therefore of historical importance for the future development of the social sciences that this methodological nationalism, as well as the related categories of perception and disciplinary organization, be theoretically, empirically, and organizationally re-assessed and reformed.

What is at stake here? Whereas in the case of the nation-state centred perspective there is an historical correspondence between normative and methodological nationalism (and for this reason this correspondence has mainly remained latent), this does not hold for the relationship between normative and methodological cosmopolitanism. In fact, the opposite is true: even the re-nationalization or re-ethnification of minds, cultures and institutions has to be analysed within a cosmopolitan frame of reference.

Cosmopolitan social science entails the systematic breaking up of the process through which the national perspective of politics and society, as well as the methodological nationalism of political science, sociology, history, and law, confirm and strengthen each other in their definitions of reality. Thus it also tackles (what had previously been analytically excluded as a sort of conspiracy of silence of conflicting basic convictions) the various developmental versions of de-bounded politics and society, corresponding research questions and programmes, the strategic expansions of the national and international political fields, as well as basic transformations in the domains of state, politics, and society.

This paradigmatic de-construction and re-construction of the social sciences from a national to a cosmopolitan outlook can be understood and methodologically justified as a ‘positive problem shift’ (Lakatos 1970), a broadening of horizons for social science research making visible new realities encouraging new research programmes (Beck and Lau 2005; Beck, Bonss and Lau 2003: 1–35). Against the background of cosmopolitan social science, it suddenly becomes obvious that it is neither possible to distinguish clearly between the national and the international, nor, correspondingly, to make a convincing contrast between homogeneous units. National spaces have become denationalized, so that the national is no longer national, just as the international is no longer international. New realities are arising: a new mapping of space and time, new co-ordinates for the social and the political are emerging which have to be theoretically and empirically researched and elaborated.

This entails a re-examination of the fundamental concepts of ‘modern society’. Household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state, commerce, public, community, justice, law, history, memory and politics must be released from the fetters of methodological nationalism, re-conceptualized, and empirically established within the framework of a new cosmopolitan social and political science. It would be hard to understate the scope of this task. But nevertheless it has to be taken up if the social sciences want to avoid becoming a museum of antiquated ideas.

#### Cosmopolitan dialogue opens up transformative space for social struggles.

Gerard Delanty 14. University of Sussex, UK “The prospects of cosmopolitanism and the possibility of global justice.” Journal of Sociology 2014, Vol. 50(2) 213–228 https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/plurispace/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/DELANTY\_Prospects-Cosmopolitanism.pdf

It is in the first instance a condition of openness to the world in the sense of the broadening of the moral and political horizon of societies. It entails a view of societies as connected rather than separated. Cosmopolitanism is made possible by the fact that individuals, groups, publics, societies have a capacity for learning in dealing with problems and, in particular, learning from each other. In this sense, then, cosmopolitanism is not a matter of diversity or mobility, but a process of learning. Dialogue is a key feature of cosmopolitanism since dialogue opens up the possibility of incorporating the perspective of others into one’s own view of the world. It can thus be associated with a communicative view of modernity. Rather than being an affirmative condition, it is transformative and is produced by social struggles rather than being primarily elite driven or entirely institutional. In this sense, cosmopolitanism can be related to popular and vernacular traditions rather than exclusively to the projects of elites (see Holton, 2009). From an epistemological perspective, cosmopolitanism involves the production of essentially critical knowledge, such as the identification of transformative potentials within the present.

Finally, cosmopolitanism is related to subject formation: it is constitutive of the self as much as it is of social and political processes. This is reflected in the von Humboldtian – in this case Wilhelm von Humboldt’s – understanding of cosmopolitanism as a particular kind of consciousness that is best exemplified in education. In the acquisition of knowledge, the self undergoes a transformation, for Bildung is a form of self-formation and occurs through the encounter of the individual with the world. Bildung is a means of encountering the universal, as reflected in the category of the world, and is the aim of education.

These features of cosmopolitanism challenge the received view of normative ideas, such as global justice as transcending political community or as simply utopian. The conception of cosmopolitanism I am putting forward is that it is constitutive of modernity and part of the make-up of political community. This is why cosmopolitanism is not a zero sum condition – either present or absent – as its critics often argue and its defenders mistakenly argue in its support. It is present to varying degrees in contemporary societies.

In order to assess the prospects of cosmopolitanism it is therefore necessary to determine the extent to which cosmopolitan phenomena are present in the cultural model of societies and in their modes of social organization and institutions. By the cultural model, I mean the social imaginary of societies, that is the dominant forms of collective identity or self-understanding. The cultural model of all modern societies involves the amplification and metamorphosis of transcultural ideas such as liberty, justice, freedom, autonomy, rights, which of course are variously interpreted and are not always fully institutionalized. But the existence of such ideas (essentially meta-norms), means that societies have the cognitive means of reaching beyond themselves. For this reason, there is generally a tension in modern societies between the cultural model and institutions. Related to these levels of analysis is the dimension of subject formation, the cosmopolitan self. It is possible that any one time in the history of a society there is a tension between subject formation, the cultural model of society, and social institutions. It is for this reason that cosmopolitanism can be seen as a critical theory of society (see Delanty, 2009): it shares with the critical heritage the concern with possibilities within the present or the immanent transcendence of society.

I am emphasizing, then, the formative dimensions of cosmopolitanism, which in other words is a structure forming itself out of both the self and society. It entails a subject (the cosmopolitan subject), a discourse in which ideas, knowledge, modes of cognition are produced, and social practices. Viewed in such terms, cosmopolitanism is a process as opposed to a fixed condition. It is marked by conflict, contradictions, negotiation. The implications of this view are that evidence of cosmopolitanism must be found not in an end state – a cosmopolitan society or state as opposed to a non-cosmopolitan one – but in the process by which it emerges. It is the task of sociology to determine whether and how this process is occurring.

#### Our political imaginary is possible and desirable.

Gerard Delanty 14. University of Sussex, UK “The prospects of cosmopolitanism and the possibility of global justice.” Journal of Sociology 2014, Vol. 50(2) 213–228 https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/plurispace/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/DELANTY\_Prospects-Cosmopolitanism.pdf

The notion that global justice is both a challenge and a possibility is a relatively new idea.1 Notions of justice have traditionally been confined to territorially limited political communities, generally nation-states, and global justice seen as a secondary or derivative matter. It was not very long ago that all questions of justice were thought to pertain to nationally defined political communities. This was certainly the assumption that Rawls made in A Theory of Justice in 1971, and which set the terms of debate for more than four decades. In the past two decades there has been a steady increase in what may be called discourses of global justice – including theoretical conceptualizations – and political practices that reflect notions of global justice. It would appear that global justice has become part of the Zeitgeist or the political imaginary of critical publics in contemporary societies as they address a range of global challenges.

To create new or possible worlds it is first of all necessary to be able to imagine them. The fact that we are unsure of what exactly constitutes global justice, but nonetheless speak of it, suggests that it is a reality of a certain kind. One might say it is a reality creating idea. The reality of global justice can now be declared to be a constitutive feature of political community. It is a way of judging the world and a way of thinking about the world, as well as a way of examining the world that challenges the exclusivity of national borders as determining the boundaries of justice. Global justice has a normative, a cognitive and an epistemological dimension: it offers principles against which injustice can be measured, it offers a language to speak about human interconnectedness, and it is a topic on which knowledge can be acquired through social research. The concern with global justice is central to the idea of cosmopolitanism, though not the only aspect of cosmopolitanism. In this article I am largely concerned with the political dimension of cosmopolitanism, which I see as the context in which to discuss global justice. The aim of the article is to explore the considerations that are at stake in assessing the prospects of cosmopolitanism today as a political project. I argue that there is scope for fruitful dialogue between sociology and political science around this question, which asks how a normative idea becomes an empirical phenomenon. In the first section I discuss the notion of global justice before outlining a theoretical approach to the analysis of cosmopolitanism. The third section of the article moves on to look at the conditions of the possibility of cosmopolitanism, before finally considering the prospects of cosmopolitanism.

#### We should create institutional loci for internationalism.

Daniele Archibugi 04. London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK and Italian National Research Council, Italy European Journal of International Relations Copyright 2004. “Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review”. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Daniele-Archibugi-2/publication/240701697\_Cosmopolitan\_Democracy\_and\_Its\_Critics\_A\_Review/links/5cc861b5299bf120978b3022/Cosmopolitan-Democracy-and-Its-Critics-A-Review.pdf

Marxist analysis maintains the existence of a permanent conflict of interests between rival social classes; interests that — now more than in the past — are in conflict not only within states, but also between states. The creation of a global citizenship will not put an end to these conflicts of interest, but that is not the ambition inspiring it. Its goal is simply to find institutional loci where these conflicts of interest could possibly be addressed and managed. If the prolonged civil war in Sierra Leone were somehow linked to the diamond trade, and the traders from Anvers, Moscow or New York were thought to play an effective role in promoting the instigation of the hostilities, what kind of institutional channels might prove effective in resolving the issue? Policies that are decided within international institutions — such as the certification of the diamonds’ origin — offer the possibility of mitigating the conflict. In other words, global institutions should offer effective channels for mending conflicts.

What needs to be revised is the political programme — not the spirit — of proletarian internationalism. Cosmopolitan democracy suggests the creation of institutions and representative channels not limited to a specific social class, but open to all individuals. Its aim is not to overcome social classes, but an objective more modest but equally ambitious — offering channels of direct representation to all people at the global level, regardless of their social status. This implies basing decision-making on global issues on the preferences of a majority, rather than on those of a single class. In this vein, Ulrich Beck (1999: 18) invoked, ‘Citizens of the world, unite!’

Trans-national campaigns have already succeeded in influencing the choices of political decision-makers — take the decision of the UK government to follow environmentally friendly procedures for the disposal of the Brent Spar (Prins and Sellwood, 1998); the institution of the International Criminal Court (Glasius, 2002); the decision of some multinationals to recede from their profit-making interests and allow for the free diffusion of the AIDS drug (Seckinelgin, 2002), or even military interventions to protect human rights (Kaldor, 2001). An international public sphere (Koehler, 1998; Cochran, 2002) is moving towards public action, and some partial but nevertheless significant results have been achieved (Pianta, 2003).

# 2AC

## Case

### AT: Nation-State Good---2AC

#### Nationalism causes war and genocide.

Virginia Matteo 20. Bachelor's degree in Spanish and English Literature. “Why Nationalism Is Dangerous.” https://soapboxie.com/social-issues/Why-Nationalism-Is-Dangerous

A Rise of Nationalism

In theory, we all should know what pursuing extreme national interests and a xenophobic agenda can lead to. . . the horrors of the two world wars are not buried in the distant past. But do we really? Perhaps those wars have become fossilized stories we can’t really relate to anymore?

An increase in the support of nationalist parties across Europe and the phenomenon of Donald Trump in the U.S. seem to indicate just that; how quickly we can forget. Populist politicians deliberately play upon the refugee crisis and the fear of terrorism to revive nationalist sentiments. In this nationalist rhetoric, the refugee and the migrant become the figures upon which all our fears materialize; the scapegoats. Nationalists want you to thing if we could get rid of migrants, society would be purged and all problems resolved. Terrorism would fade into oblivion, the working class would live in bliss, and the prices of houses would fall.

Except none of it would really happen. Picking a victim and blaming them for all that’s wrong, as understandable from a psychological point of view as it may be, will lead to nothing but violence and creating even more problems. Nationalists think they have a simple cure for all social ailments, but in fact they terribly misdiagnosed the patient. Theirs is the kind of thinking that led people to believe that if they sacrifice enough victims, the gods will show mercy and send them the long-awaited rain.

Of course nationalism doesn’t boil down to blaming migrants for every evil. It’s a complex phenomenon with many faces across the world and throughout history. But it is still possible to identify some common features that may be dangerous.

Pitting One Nation Against Another

In post imperial Britain the notions of “nation” and “race” were played upon by the Conservative party in an attempt to revive political language at a time when the UK had lost their sway over a significant portion of the world. The scheme of restoring past glory and a sense of value to the nation was carried out by defining the British nation against a surge of immigrants that were coming to the country, especially black settlers. The proper British way of life was seen in opposition to alien, threatening, dangerous ways of life. In short, the creation of a white homogenous British nation that overlooked differences such as class, gender, regional identities, was only possible by saying what this nation wasn’t (it wasn’t black, it wasn’t criminal, it wasn’t dangerous).

Scholars of nationalism agree that achieving a consensus about national identity requires identifying an Other inside or outside the national borders, that is somehow inferior to the nation itself. The exclusion and derogation of other cultures inside a state can lead to a series of social problem such as legitimization of abuse, alienation, in extreme cases violence. It is also problematic because it is only natural that the abused and alienated victim will look for an alternative identity, finding consolation in their own version of nationalism. Two hostile communities (parts of them, at least) that despise each other’s cultures and are unable to communicate is no good news. Especially if one community significantly outnumbers the other.

National Will: Where Does It Reside?

In nationalist rhetoric whatever the people do, or wish, or rather what politicians say that the people wish, is inherently good by virtue of it being the “will of the people”. The consequence of the nation being held the highest good is a dangerous lack of self-criticism and a very dubious sense of morality. The national interest can be used to justify just about anything.

Another problem is that the national will is highly malleable to different political agendas. It should not be understood as a pure expression of the nation, as some nationalists seem to understand it, but rather as a political tool for pursuing particular political goals. Many politicians claim the right to speak on behalf of the nation, but how do they identify the national will? Where does it reside? How is it created? How is it measured? Does a politician just “feel” it? Is it unanimous?

A politician brandishing the national will is giving themselves essentially carte blanche to do anything they claim is in the national interest and shows that they are unwilling to compromise on anything that could in their opinion harm the nation. Putting ideology over pragmatism certainly is not the best entry into dialogue on an international level; it can cause misunderstanding and the nation’s isolation.

Nation-Building Is Repressive

According to some models, nation-building requires in agrarian societies a landed elite to subjugate the peasantry. The emergence of a nation is frequently preceded by gory peasant revolts, especially in colonial and post-colonial contexts in the Middle East and South Asia, where the predominant economic model is agrarian capitalism. Nationalist violence isn’t always directed outward; it is also used against the same people it supposedly cherishes. This is one of the many paradoxes of nationalism; it glorifies the nation, the people, but at the same time it crashes those of its own people that dare to disagree. Nationalism’s dream of unity is impossible to achieve without a degree of violence and coercion (conscripting armies is one example of state repression). Nationalism pretends to represent the totality of the nation, but on close inspection it is obvious that it constantly struggles to hold the nation together and there are other identities that challenge it.

The Threats of Civil War and Genocide

In multi-ethnic and multi-religious states (many of such states were erected by colonial powers in the Middle East), if different groups disagree about what should be the basis of national consciousness, there always exists the danger of civil war. History provides too many sad examples of struggles over hegemony that resulted in utter human tragedy. Genocides on Iraqi Shi’is and Kurds by the Ba’thist regime in Iraq, the massacres of Shi’is and Tajiks by the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Bosnian civil war, the civil war in Tajikistan and the Ayodhya and Bombay massacres of Muslims in India. As Juan R. I. Cole and Deniz Kandiyoti sum it up these events should: “stand as reminders of how the post-colonial national imagination can turn, just as had some European nationalisms, toward dark fantasies of ethnic hegemony and even homogenization.”

### AT: Nation-State Inev---2AC

#### Socio-cognitive shifts are possible---defeatism is prescriptive---only political imagination can solve.

Gerard Delanty 14. University of Sussex, UK “The prospects of cosmopolitanism and the possibility of global justice.” Journal of Sociology 2014, Vol. 50(2) 213–228 <https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/plurispace/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/DELANTY_Prospects-Cosmopolitanism.pdf>

Evidence of major change can never be easily found in the short term. Criticisms of cosmopolitanism that invoke the obvious presence of counter-cosmopolitan trends – which presumably presuppose cosmopolitan currents – are too short-sighted in focusing on a short time span or on reactive events. The Axial Age breakthrough itself took several centuries – 800 to 200 bc – to produce the first universalistic visions, which laid the foundations for the emergence of cosmopolitanism, and the tumultuous history of democracy is itself a reminder of the need to take a longer view on major social and political transformation. Thus the fact that there is much evidence of global injustice does not mean that global justice is absent from the self-understanding of contemporary critical publics or that it has no consequences. The thesis of this article is that the most compelling evidence resides less in manifest institutional change – despite considerable gains, as discussed in the preceding section – than in socio-cognitive shifts in learning competences. Thus the structuring impact that global justice has had on the political imagination in recent times is essentially more of a cognitive than a normative development in redefining the self-understanding of political community.

### AT: Class Fracture---2AC

#### Radicalize the academy from within.

Aidan Gnoth 19, PhD Graduate and Researcher at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at University of Otago, “A crisis of criticality? Reimagining academia in international peacebuilding,” Thesis for doctorate degree in Philosophy at the University of Otago, November 2019, https://ourarchive.otago.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10523/9990/Gnoth%20Aidan%20-%20A%20Crisis%20of%20Criticality.pdf?sequence=1

But right now, today, PACs scholars (and one would assume, many others) are increasingly reflecting on their position in this order. Ever more articles and research agendas contest this position (Richmond, 2007a; Shinko, 2008; Paris, 2014; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015; Allen and Dinnen, 2017) and a string of introspective conferences on the field of PACs may have significant consequences for a critical (re)capture of the Ivory Tower.142 While it is unlikely that scholars will be able to resist the bureaucratic elites who have taken over their administrative thrones – many such elites being academics themselves – there is still a space for scholars to undertake acts of everyday and epistemic resistance and to ensure a more critical and emancipatory research agenda. Indeed, bureaucratic and financial pressures are set to continue diminishing the role of academia and education (Kelly and Kelly, 2013), potentially increasing the need for scholars to exercise their responsibilities from outside the University and privileged positions within the Global North.

Transformation may still be made from within, however. As in the period of decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s, PACs scholars and departments should make concerted efforts to radicalise their pedagogy (Freire, 2000; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012; Connell, 2014; de Sousa Santos, 2018) and side with the millions of voices calling for change. The systems of power and ruling elites all over the world are being contested, as daily protests in Hong Kong, Brazil, France and the U.S.A, and a host of social and environmental movements are showing. Nonviolent resistance is successfully being used to challenge abuses of power (Vinthagen, 2015), and this new world has a role in which both critical scholars and problem solvers may unite in a shared agenda for peace. For example, problem solving theorists might look to improve the techniques and strategies of such movements, to find ways in which subaltern groups may avoid Big Brother’s corporate and state surveillance, and spread awareness of the abuses of power. Meanwhile, Critical Theorists can take a more concerted and imaginative effort to question what new futures and realities could lie ahead by increasing their focus on those non-state communities in Mexico, Syria, Bolivia and others who have worked together to not only resist power, but redefine the structures and systems of society in more socially and ecologically just ways. Such research agendas may be too extreme for some readers, especially those who simply ‘came here for the peacebuilding’. However, there are numerous ways in which these scholars can push towards a more emancipatory agenda, irrespective of the extent to which they are dissatisfied with the current system. The following section outlines possible solutions to the problems highlighted in the previous chapters of this thesis, including future research that can be undertaken to better understand how criticality is reduced with the explicit intent of actively countering this.

## Off

### T---2AC

#### Requirements that dialogue or debate start from competition fixes the gaze of our research agenda---it necessitates otherization and comparative reflexivity.

Pauli Kettunen 21. Professor of Political History in the Social Science Faculty of University of Helsinki. "Welfare state, competition state, security state: Nationalism in nation-state responses to crossborder mobilities." In Remapping Security on Europe’s Northern Borders, pp. 201-220. Routledge, 2021.

Reforming the welfare state in the direction of the competition state clearly differs from Myrdal’s vision of expanding it into a welfare world. Critical visions of global policies could be opened from the universalistic principles of the national welfare state, as Myrdal, and later Pekka Kuusi (1985), did. Transforming the welfare state in the direction of the competition state fixes the gaze on national agency in a way that closes the window to such visions. “Welfare” does not itself imply a distinction between us and others; “competitiveness” does.

The importance of comparisons in national politics is no novelty, yet promoting the competitiveness of a nation in global competition implies new requirements of comparative reflexivity. “We” within a given territorial – local, regional, European, yet in the first place national – framework are supposed to make us attractive and competitive in the face of those who compare different environments from a transnational perspective in their decision making regarding flows of money, investment, and the location of production and jobs. This means being able to constantly assess one’s own actions and capacities from the varying and changing positions of those actors who compare us with others. In addition to divisions between us and others, the distinction between the internal and external is reproduced. Globalisation, notably the crossborder mobility of capital, is naturalised as necessities of external environment; national society is commodified as a competitive community.

#### We meet---the 1AC is “resolved:” over the resolution because it analyzes and deals with its elements---solves their offense.

Merriam-Websterhttps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve

Definition of resolve

resolved; resolving

transitive verb

1 obsolete : dissolve, melt

2 a : break up, separate the prism resolved the light into a play of color; also : to change by disintegration

b : to reduce by analysis resolve the problem into simple elements

c : to distinguish between or make independently visible adjacent parts of

d : to separate (a racemic compound or mixture) into the two components

3 : to cause resolution of (a pathological state)

4 a : to deal with successfully : clear up resolve doubts resolve a dispute

b : to find an answer to

c : to make clear or understandable

d : to find a mathematical solution of

e : to split up into two or more components especially in assigned directions resolve a vector

5 : to reach a firm decision about resolve to get more sleep resolve disputed points in a text

6 a : to declare or decide by a formal resolution and vote

b : to change by resolution or formal vote the house resolved itself into a committee

7 : to make (something, such as one or more voice parts or the total musical harmony) progress from dissonance to consonance

8 : to work out the resolution of (something, such as a play)

#### Topical version and switch side arguments presume establishing a just frame when our argument is framing cannot be just.

Nancy Fraser 05. Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School. “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World, NLR 36, November–December 2005.” New Left Review. https://newleftreview-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/issues/ii36/articles/nancy-fraser-reframing-justice-in-a-globalizing-world

The politics of framing can take two distinct forms, both of which are now being practised in our globalizing world.footnote12 The first approach, which I shall call the affirmative politics of framing, contests the boundaries of existing frames while accepting the Westphalian grammar of frame-setting. In this politics, those who claim to suffer injustices of misframing seek to redraw the boundaries of existing territorial states or in some cases to create new ones. But they still assume that the territorial state is the appropriate unit within which to pose and resolve disputes about justice. For them, injustices of misframing are not a function of the general principle according to which the Westphalian order partitions political space. They arise, rather, as a result of the faulty way in which that principle has been applied. Thus, those who practise the affirmative politics of framing accept that the principle of state-territoriality is the proper basis for constituting the ‘who’ of justice. They agree, in other words, that what makes a given collection of individuals into fellow subjects of justice is their shared residence on the territory of a modern state and/or their shared membership in the political community that corresponds to such a state. Thus, far from challenging the underlying grammar of the Westphalian order, those who practise the affirmative politics of framing accept its state-territorial principle.

Precisely that principle is contested, however, in a second version of the politics of framing, which I shall call the transformative approach. For its proponents, the state-territorial principle no longer affords an adequate basis for determining the ‘who’ of justice in every case. They concede, of course, that that principle remains relevant for many purposes; thus, supporters of transformation do not propose to eliminate state-territoriality entirely. But they contend that its grammar is out of synch with the structural causes of many injustices in a globalizing world, which are not territorial in character. Examples include the financial markets, ‘offshore factories’, investment regimes and governance structures of the global economy, which determine who works for a wage and who does not; the information networks of global media and cybertechnology, which determine who is included in the circuits of communicative power and who is not; and the bio-politics of climate, disease, drugs, weapons and biotechnology, which determine who will live long and who will die young. In these matters, so fundamental to human well-being, the forces that perpetrate injustice belong not to ‘the space of places’, but to ‘the space of flows’.footnote13 Not locatable within the jurisdiction of any actual or conceivable territorial state, they cannot be made answerable to claims of justice that are framed in terms of the state-territorial principle. In their case, so the argument goes, to invoke the state-territorial principle to determine the frame is itself to commit an injustice. By partitioning political space along territorial lines, this principle insulates extra- and non-territorial powers from the reach of justice. In a globalizing world, therefore, it is less likely to serve as a remedy for misframing than as a means of inflicting or perpetuating it.

### K---2AC

#### The alt challenges hegemony---the aff can’t

Daniele Archibugi 04. London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK and Italian National Research Council, Italy European Journal of International Relations Copyright 2004. “Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review”. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Daniele-Archibugi-2/publication/240701697\_Cosmopolitan\_Democracy\_and\_Its\_Critics\_A\_Review/links/5cc861b5299bf120978b3022/Cosmopolitan-Democracy-and-Its-Critics-A-Review.pdf

American Hegemony

Today’s world is dominated by a hegemonic bloc where a single state, the United States, is endowed with extraordinary powers and the mandate to defend very narrow economic interests (Chandler, 2001; Gower, 2001). This hegemon goes so far as to resort to military power in order to penetrate economic and political activity. Critics have described how many international organizations — such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and NATO — also serve the purpose of maintaining and preserving the interests of this new hegemonic bloc. Basing observation on real-world conditions, these critics argue that a project that aims to empower global institutions to coordinate and monitor national policies leads de facto to a decrease in the independence of the various states and, ultimately, reinforces the ideology of the current hegemonic power. Authors such as Zolo, Gowen and Chandler have noted how those same years that witnessed audacious projects for UN reform and the democratiza tion of global governance, also witnessed the significant military engagement of Western states. In the lead up to their use of force, these states employed a rhetoric dangerously resembling those discourses that long for a global order founded on the values of lawfulness and democracy.

I have already argued that the amount of power concentrated within the hands of the United States is excessive, and that its domestic democracy is no guarantee for the wise or lawful application of such power. However, the key is to find a strategy that can effectively oppose this hegemonic bloc. Contrary to Zolo, Gowen, Chandler et al., I dispute the ability of the old sovereignty dogma to provide a satisfactory alternative to US hegemony, or to any hegemony, for that matter. Until this moment, the appeal to sovereignty has served the purpose of aiding governments in abusing their citizens, rather than offering weaker states protection from the greed of the strongest states. The strengthening of international institutions, especially if inspired by the values of democracy, would most probably produce the desired effect of obliging the United States and its allies to engage in a foreign policy much more in line with their own constitutions. Barricading ourselves behind the notion of sovereignty merely for the sake of counterbalancing America’s hegemony may cause us to forget the millions of people who are subjected every day to oppression from their own governments. The recent conflict in Iraq seems to reinforce this point. On the one hand, the lack of international consensus and legitimacy did not constrain two democratic states, the USA and the UK, from waging war against international law. On the other hand, the international community lacked non-coercive instruments to protest against the violation of human rights by the Iraqi government since it had the status of representing a ‘sovereign’ state. The cosmopolitan perspective would, on the contrary, have urged the international community to take other actions, such as smart sanctions, to oppose and ultimately remove the Iraqi government.

#### Humanism is not “sameness” and the logic it is IS the logic of nation-states---the frame of the human is key to mobilize movements to stop warming---the thesis of their grammar obscures struggles in the Global South.

Karenga 6—Professor and Chair Department of Africa Studies at Cal State University and a major figure in the Black Power movement [Maulana, *Philosophy in the African Tradition of Resistance: Issues or Human Freedom and Human Flourishing in Not Only The Master’s Tools*, 2006, p. 242-5]

Surely, we are at a moment of history fraught with new and old fOnTIS of anxiety, alienation, and antagonism; deepening poverty in the midst of increasing wealth; proposals and practices of ethnic cleansing and genocide; pandemic diseases; increased plunder; pollution and depletion of the environment; constant conflicts, large and small; and world-threatening delusions on the part of a superpower aspiring to a return to empire, with spurious claims of the right to preemptive aggression, to openly attack and overthrow nonfavored and fragile governments openly, and to seize the lands and resources of vulnerable peoples and establish "democracy" through military dictatorship abroad, all the while suppressing political dissent at home (Chang 2002; Cole et at. 2002). These anxieties are undergirded by racist and religious chauvinism, by the self-righteous and veiled references of these rulers to themselves as a kind of terrible and terrorizing hand of God, appointed to rid the world of evil (Ahmad 2002; Arnin 2001; Blum1995). At the same time, in this context of turmoil and terror and the use and threatened use of catastrophic weapons, there is the irrational and arrogant expectation that the oppressed will acquiesce, abandon resistance, and accept the disruptive and devastating consequences of globalization, along with the global hegemony it implies (Martin and Schumann 1997). There is great alarm among the white-supremicist rulers of these globalizing nations, given the metical resistance rising up against them, even as globalization’s technological, organizational, and economic capacity continues to expand (Barber 1996; Karenga 2002e, 2003a; Lusane 1997). There is great alarm when people who should "know" when they are defeated ridicule the assessment, refuse to be defeated or dispirited, and, on the contrary, intensify and diversify their struggles (Zepezauer 2002). Certainly the battlefields of Palestine, Venezuela, long suffering Haiti, and Chiapas, Mexico, along with other continuing emancipatory struggles everywhere, reaffirm the indomitable character of the human spirit and the durability and adaptive vitality of a people determined to be free, regardless of the odds and assessments against them. Indeed, they remind us that the motive force of history is struggle, informed by the ongoing quest for freedom, justice, power of the masses, and peace in the world. Despite "end of history" claims and single-super- power resolve and resolutions, these struggles continue. For still the oppressed want freedom, the wronged and injured want justice, the people want power over their destiny and daily lives, and the world wants peace. And all over the world-especially in this U.S. citadel of aging capitalism with its archaic dreams of empire-clarity in the analysis of issues, and in the critical determination of tasks and prospects, requires the deep and disciplined reflection characteristic of the personal and social practice we call philosophy. But this sense of added urgency for effective intervention is prompted not only by the critical juncture at which we stand but also by an awareness of our long history of resistance as a people, because in our collective strivings and social struggles we seek a new future for our people, our descendants, and the world. Joined also to these conditions and considerations is the compelling character of our self-understanding as a people, as a moral vanguard in this country and the world. For we have launched, fought, and won with our allies struggles that not only have expanded the realm of freedom in this country and the world but also have served as an ongoing inspiration and a model of liberation struggles for other marginalized and oppressed peoples and groups throughout the world. Indeed, they have borrowed from and built on our moral vocabulary and moral vision, sung our songs of freedom, and held up our struggle for liberation as a model to emulate. Now, self-understanding and self-assertion are dialectically linked. In other words, how we understand ourselves in the world determines how we assert ourselves in the world. Thus, an expansive concept of ourselves as Africans-continental and diasporan-and as Africana philosophers forms an essential component of our sense of mission and the urgency with which we approach it. It is important to note that I have conceived and written this chapter within the framework of Kausaida philosophy (Karenga 1978, 1980, 1997) Kawaida is a philosophic initiative that was forged in the crucible of ideological and practical struggles around issues of freedom, justice, equalitys, self-determination, conullunal power, self-defense, pan~African- ism, coalition and alliance, Black Studies, intellectual emancipation, and cultural recovery and reconstlouction. It continued to develop in the midst of these ongoing struggies within the life of the mind and stmggles iottbtn the life of the people, as well as within the context of the conditions of the world. Kawaida is defined as an ongoing synthesis of the best of xAfrican thought and practice in constant exchange tuttb tl3e 'U)()ltd. It characterizes culture as a unique, instructive and valuable way of being human in the world-as a foundation and framework for self-understanding and self-assertion. As a philosophy of culture and struggle, Kawaida maintains that our intellectual and social practice as Nricana activist scholars must be undergirded and informed by ongoing efforts to (1) ground our- selves in our own culture; (2) constantly recover, reconstruct, .and bring forth from our culture the best of what it means to be African and human in the fullest sense; (3) speak this special cultural truth to the world and (4) use our culture to constantly make our own unique contribution to the reconception and reconstruction of this country, and to the forward flow of human history.

### Antitrust CP---2AC

#### It turns their antitrust good arguments.

Sanjukta Paul 20, assistant Professor of Law at Wayne State Law School, “Antitrust As Allocator of Coordination Rights,” UCLA Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 2, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3337861

INTRODUCTION

The central function of antitrust law is to allocate economic coordination rights. This means that private decisions to engage in economic coordination are always subject to public approval, which antitrust law grants either expressly or tacitly. Currently, its methods for accomplishing this function have the effect of anointing control and concentrated power as the preferred form of economic coordination, and to frown upon forms of economic coordination in which power and decisionmaking are more broadly dispersed. Antitrust law’s current methods for allocating coordination rights include what I call its firm exemption, as well as its preference for vertical over horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries. Antitrust’s methods of allocating coordination rights are ultimately indigenous, and cannot be explained away by external referents: neither by other areas of law, nor by putatively neutral conclusions of social science. They are also historically contingent, and have shifted over time.

Practically speaking, the reigning antitrust paradigm authorizes large, powerful firms as the primary mechanisms of economic and market coordination, while largely undermining others: from workers’ organizations to small business cooperation to democratic regulation of markets. While deploying the legal concept of competition to undermine disfavored forms of economic coordination, antitrust law also quietly underwrites certain major exceptions to principles of competition, notably, the business firm itself. In surfacing the firm exemption, this Article also isolates the underlying, largely unexamined decision criteria for allocating coordination rights that it employes.

The current paradigm for thinking and decisionmaking within antitrust law has a professed commitment to implementing the insights of neoclassical economic theory in legal decisionmaking.1 According to that framework, the aggregate of individual market transactions, rather than direct coordination, will result in an optimal allocation of society’s resources. But this process of market allocation, which the law is supposed to facilitate but not displace, itself has no existence independent of prior legal allocations of economic coordination rights. Those coordination rights are shaped by numerous areas of law—from property to corporate law to labor law to antitrust, among others. This Article focuses on antitrust law, where this function is rarely acknowledged. Although the law and economics paradigm has enormous institutional sticking power in current antitrust law, the basic purposes and methods of antitrust law are also up for debate today in a way that they have not been in decades. Recent contributions to the antitrust revival have emphasized the law’s traditional concerns with corporate power and fairness, which were largely written out of antitrust law in the Chicago School revolution. 2 Dissenting voices asserted these as legitimate antitrust concerns even prior to the current challenge. 3 Mirroring the reformist call to put some limits upon the broad coordination rights of the powerful, a growing chorus of scholarship has emphasized the need to expand the coordination rights of small players to some extent or another, beginning with the question of workers and microenterprises caught between labor and antitrust regulation.4

However, proposals to reform antitrust, or to reconceptualize it, have thus far generally stopped short of questioning the basic premise that its primary function is to promote competition. At least officially, if increasingly uneasily, competition is still king. To be sure, many posit that antitrust performs this stated function badly, or does not perform it at all in certain markets.5 Even when reintroducing values such as fairness and deconcentrating power, for the most part the reform camp has characterized those values as flowing from—or at least coextensive with—promoting or protecting competition. Thus, the political debate over antitrust has been characterized by all sides claiming the idea of competition and defining what it means to promote competition in different ways.

In the current moment of paradigm instability,6 this Article aims to serve a clarifying role. Defenders of Chicago School antitrust tend to view reformers’ concerns—for example, fairness or deconcentrating corporate power—are extraneous to the fundamental function of antitrust law. That view, however, relies upon the idea that the function of antitrust law is to promote competition and that the law does so by following the independent guidance of economics. But neither of these things is true. Antitrust law decides where competition will be required and where coordination will be permitted. And in accomplishing that task, its most fundamental judgments are not ultimately derived from a neutral external referent, such as economic theory. Meanwhile, as the opposition to antitrust’s targeting of small players’ economic cooperation builds, some have begun to respond that this opposition evinces an inconsistency within the antitrust reform program, which otherwise generally favors increased antitrust enforcement. But, again, this objection only makes sense if one assumes that antitrust’s purpose is to promote competition, full stop. By showing that antitrust in fact already allocates coordination rights, I also show that a conscious reallocation would not constitute a special exemption from a general principle. Instead, it would simply be a different allocation of coordination rights, requiring justification no more and no less than the current one. By reframing antitrust law as this Article does, we can clarify what we are actually debating: what criteria should antitrust law use to allocate economic coordination rights? What forms of economic coordination should it permit or even promote, and what forms of economic coordination should it discourage or even prohibit?

Part I of the Article sets out the doctrinal and logical argument that a core function of antitrust law is to allocate economic coordination rights, that its disfavor of horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries is an example of this function, and that this function cannot be reduced to the operation of other areas of law. Part II then shows how antitrust’s firm exemption, as embodied in Supreme Court case law, involves the concentration of economic coordination rights—a preference that is mirrored in other aspects of antitrust doctrine as well.

Part III briefly describes how these criteria for allocating coordination rights—preferring control over cooperation, and naturalizing the coordination embodied in hierarchically organized business firms— resulted from a historically contingent process within the development of antitrust law itself. Part IV addresses the contention that this allocation of coordination rights can be rationalized and justified by reference to economic theory, focusing on a now-foundational argument articulated by Robert Bork.

I. ANTITRUST LAW’S OVERALL ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC COORDINATION RIGHTS

Antitrust law’s core function is to allocate coordination rights to some economic actors and deny them to others. This makes private decisions to engage in economic coordination subject to public approval, which antitrust law grants either expressly or tacitly. Importantly, this reframing is an analytic claim that redescribes existing reality; it is not a normative claim about what antitrust law ought to do. That said, reframing antitrust law this way renders visible economic coordination that has been naturalized and invites us to consider anew forms of economic coordination that have been presumed illegitimate. Ultimately, transparency about antitrust law’s core function should lead to transparency in performing it—that is, in articulating and defending the criteria by which coordination rights are allocated. Currently, those criteria are often obscure and implicit; where they are acknowledged at all, they are often presumed, incorrectly, to be derived from the independent conclusions of social science.

Economic coordination is always either authorized by antitrust law, or not. For any given instance of economic coordination, and certainly for any instance of economic coordination implicating prices, antitrust asks—either explicitly or implicitly—whether that coordination is justified, and then answers that question one way or the other. Moreover, the answers that antitrust gives to these questions are not derivable from property, contract, or corporate law—though its answers interact with each of these.

Currently, antitrust law tends to allocate coordination rights, across doctrinal areas, according to criteria that systematically prefer concentrated control over dispersed coordination or cooperation. If we envision antitrust’s approach to allocating economic coordination rights as a three-legged stool, its conception of the firm is one leg. The other two are its treatment of horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries and its treatment of vertical coordination beyond firm boundaries. In deciding how to evaluate interfirm coordination, antitrust law first decides whether that coordination is horizontal (between competitor firms in the same market) or vertical(between firms in adjacent markets, such as supplier or distributor relationships). Antitrust law’s stark preference for coordination accomplished through vertical contracting over horizontal interfirm coordination mirrors the criteria according to which the firm exemption itself is applied. Both preferences embody the preference for control over cooperation, which is to say, for the concentration of economic coordination in fewer rather in many hands. This Article focuses primarily on the firm exemption because it is the most obscure of the three legs, and because both vertical interfirm coordination and horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries are dealt with in greater detail in other work.7 For context, I briefly summarize the doctrinal content of the other two legs of the stool, and their relationship to the firm exemption. I also briefly describe the role of the Chicago School revolution in establishing this overall allocation of coordination rights, although this Article does not provide an exhaustive account of historical origins or etiology of current doctrine.8

A. Horizontal and Vertical Interfirm Coordination

Horizontal coordination beyond firm boundaries—including between individuals—has become increasingly disfavored in antitrust law over time, while vertical interfirm coordination has come increasingly into favor. Together, these tendencies represent the same preference for control over dispersed coordination that is embodied in the firm exemption itself. Moreover, the disfavor of horizontal interfirm coordination adds to the significance of the firm exemption by allocating certain coordination rights uniquely to firms.

I do not claim that a single school or influence within antitrust law is, by itself, responsible for this overall allocation of coordination rights: the legs of the stool have been built with a variety of materials over an extended time. Yet the Chicago School revolution in antitrust analysis has played an important role in creating or intensifying several aspects of antitrust’s current approach to allocating coordination rights, and some background on its influence is therefore warranted.

The Chicago School influence helped to construct antitrust’s attitude to both horizontal and vertical interfirm coordination in a few ways. First, it intentionally cleared away specific normative benchmarks in older antitrust analysis—notably, conceptions of fair business conduct,the flourishing of small enterprise, and attention to the influence of disparities in economic power upon the polity—that would have provided counterweights to other legal criteria. Second, the Chicago School elevated and intensified the focus upon the ideal competitive order as the unitary normative framework for antitrust analysis; that framework implies that horizontal interfirm coordination has inherently distorting effects. Third, the Chicago School specifically argued for relaxing antitrust scrutiny of vertical interfirm coordination.

### Econ DA---2AC

#### Growth drives extinction and structural violence.

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This is the question that vexed us as we set out to write The Tragedy of the Worker. From the vantage point of the present, the history of capitalist development is, as Marx expected, the history of the development of a global working class, the proletarianisation of the majority of the world’s population. But the very same process of that development has brought us to the precipice of climate disaster. Our position, to recall Trotsky’s rationalisation of War Communism in 1920, is in the highest degree tragic.

It is now clear that we will pass what scientists have long warned will be a tipping point of global warming, accelerating the already catastrophic consequences of capitalist emissions. How do we imagine emancipation on an at best partially habitable planet? Where once communists imagined seizing the means of production, taking the unprecedented capacities of capitalist infrastructures and using them to build a world of plenty, what must we imagine after the apocalypse has befallen us? What does it mean that as capitalism has become truly global, the gravediggers it has created dig not only capitalism’s grave, but also that of much organic life on earth?

Our answers to these questions remain rooted in the politics of revolutionary communism. Our stance is not based on the fantasy of a homeostatic nature that must be defended but on the critique of the capitalist metabolism – the Stoffwechsel- that must be overthrown. Earth scientists are accustomed to speak in terms of ‘cycles’ by which substances circulate in different forms: the water cycle, the rock cycle, the nitrogen cycle, the glacial-interglacial cycle, the carbon cycle, and others. One way of registering the catastrophe of climate change is to see these cycles – most of all, but not solely, the carbon cycle – as disordered, under- or over-accumulating. But this is to ignore the more fundamental circuit of which these now form epicycles, like Ptolemy’s sub-orbits of the heavenly bodies: the circuit of capital accumulation, M-C-M′.

This circuit accumulates profit and produces death. Neither is accidental. It is for this reason that the debates that capitalist ruling classes permit among themselves on ‘adaptation’ versus ‘mitigation’ take place on false premises. What is to be mitigated is the impact of climate change on accumulation, rendered through the ideology of ‘growth’ as something that benefits everyone. What we are to adapt to are the parameters of accumulation, sacrificing just enough islands, eco-systems, indigenous – and non-indigenous – cultures to maintain its imperatives for a period of time until new thresholds must be crossed, and new life sacrificed to the pagan idol of capital. Already, capitalist petro-modernity builds a certain quantum of acceptable death into its predicates: at the very least, the 8.7 million killed by fossil fuels each year according to Harvard University are considered a price worth paying for the stupendous advantages of fossil capital. And the sky can only keep going up, as deforestation, polar melt, ocean acidification, soil de-fertilisation and more intense wildfires and storms tear the web of life into patches. If the necropolitical calculus of the Covid-19 pandemic appears crass, just wait until its premises are applied to climate catastrophe.

#### The economy is in general crisis---financialization, social reproduction, ecology and politics are all terminally doomed.

Nancy Fraser 9/10/21. professor of philosophy and politics at the New School for Social Research. Interviewed by Martín Mosquera. "Nancy Fraser: “Cannibal Capitalism” Is on Our Horizon". No Publication. 9-10-2021. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/09/nancy-fraser-cannibal-capitalism-interview

MM

As you point out, the COVID crisis is a dramatic example of how these externalities interact in complicated ways with capitalism, leading to the kind of capitalist crises that you’ve described as “multidimensional.” Elsewhere, you’ve also suggested that, at least since 2008, the current stage of financialized, neoliberal capitalism is undergoing a crisis — perhaps terminal — that could eventually mean a historical shift to a different form of capitalist accumulation. How do you evaluate the current crisis?

NF

I want to underline several points that are already implicit in the way you pose the question. One is that we should distinguish between sectoral crises and general crises. A sectoral crisis means that there is one significant area in a given capitalist regime of accumulation or phase of capitalist development that is overtly dysfunctional, while others appear to be more or less okay. We often tend to think of economic crises as sectoral in just this way. Historians could point to numerous examples of such sectoral crises, which pertain to one realm of society only. But that’s different from a general crisis of the whole social order. The concept of a general crisis suggests a convergence or overdetermination of several major impasses and strands of dysfunction. Not just one sector, but all or nearly all major societal sectors are in crisis and are exacerbating one another. That was the case in the 1930s, for example.

I suspect that we are living through a general crisis of this sort now. Certainly, we have seen severe forms of economic crisis, like the 2007–8 financial near-meltdown. And although it may have looked as if our rulers found a way to patch that up, that crisis is not really solved. Pervasive financialization remains a ticking time bomb. But, as the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report shows, our economic woes have converged with another very severe, even catastrophic crisis: namely, global warming. This ecological crisis has been brewing

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for a long time and is now becoming palpable. More and more segments of the global population, including segments that have been relatively insulated from its worst effects, are awakening to it.

There is also, as I said before, a crisis of social reproduction, which is stressing or depleting our capacities for creating, caring for, and sustaining human beings: childcare and eldercare, education and health care. As states disinvest from public provision, and as depressed wage levels force us to devote more hours to paid work, the system gobbles up the time and energy needed for care work. So, that sector too is in crisis, especially in pandemic conditions. One could say that COVID has greatly exacerbated the preexisting crisis of social reproduction. But it would be just as true to say that the preexisting crisis of social reproduction (including disinvestment from public health infrastructure and social provision) has greatly exacerbated the effects of COVID.

Finally, we also face a major political crisis. This is, at one level, a crisis of governance, meaning that even powerful states like the United States lack the capacity to solve the problems the system generates. They are depleted, paralyzed by gridlock and outgunned by megacorporations, which have captured virtually all regulatory agencies and engineered huge tax cuts for themselves and for the rich. Deprived of revenue for decades, states have allowed their infrastructures to crumble and have depleted their stockpiles of essential public goods, such as personal protective equipment (PPE). They are, by definition, unable to deal with questions like climate change, which are not containable within any jurisdictional borders. The upshot is an acute crisis of governance at the structural level. But there’s also a political crisis at another level, a crisis of hegemony in the Gramscian sense: the widespread defection from politics as usual, from the established political parties and elites who have been tarnished by association with neoliberalization, and the appearance of previously unthinkable populisms — some potentially emancipatory, others decidedly not.

The upshot is that we now face a tangle of multiple crises: an economic crisis, a crisis of social reproduction, an ecological crisis, and a two-sided political crisis. To my mind, this adds up to a general crisis of capitalist society. Its effects pop out all over, first here, then there, then somewhere else, like a metastasizing cancer. Every effort to patch up one outbreak only leads to others, afflicting other sectors, regions, populations, until the whole social body is overwhelmed. The experience of general crisis has become palpable for many people, but that doesn’t mean that it will produce a total breakdown or revolutionary climax any time soon. Capitalist crises can go on for decades, unfortunately. One could say that the whole first half of the twentieth century up until the defeat of fascism at the end of World War II was just one long, roiling general crisis of liberal-colonial capitalism. So, we might be in for a long slog.

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## Econ DA

### Solvency---2NC

#### Yes political will.

Atkins 21 [CJ, Managing Editor at People’s World with a Ph.D. in political science from York University in Toronto. Neoliberalism’s in trouble: A Marxist look at the American Rescue Act. People's World. 3-11-2021. https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/neoliberalisms-in-trouble-a-marxist-look-at-the-american-rescue-act/]

Change from below

Many analysts are taking notice of this paradigm change. Paul McCulley, a business professor at Georgetown, told the New York Times earlier this week, “Having the tools of economic stabilization work a whole lot more through the fiscal channel and a whole lot less through the monetary channel is a profound, pro-democracy policy mix.” In plainer language: It’s better to have elected representatives rather than unelected bankers making the call on how public money is spent.

Some media commentators are seeing the shift, but they’re missing the real reasons for why it’s happening. Times opinion writer Neil Irwin, for instance, characterizes it as a battle between “pointy-headed technocrats” and lawmakers, or as the headline of his article earlier this week put it, “Move over, nerds. It’s the politicians’ economy now.”

Without the insights that come from a class analysis of the situation, Irwin and other commentators in the bourgeois press continue to look only at the differences among those at the top of society to explain social change. The truth, however, is that the pressure now being applied to neoliberal ideology is the result of class struggle from below.

Since the last recession, working-class action has been steadily building and gaining strength. The first sparks came in the Occupy Wall Street movement that emerged in the wake of the financial crisis. There were the two Bernie Sanders campaigns for president as well as that of Elizabeth Warren, which inserted explicitly social democratic demands like Medicare for All into public conversation.

The trade union movement has begun to reverse its decades-long decline, with new organizing efforts like the campaign by Alabama Amazon workers showing that more and more workers are looking to collective action as the way to improve their lives.

The Black Lives Matter national uprising, with its demand to defund policing and militarization and redirect funds toward human needs, has melded together the fights to end racism and economic inequality.

Opinion polls have shown interest in the ideas of socialism gaining steam for several years already, showing up also in the fact that left-wing organizations like Democratic Socialists of America and the Communist Party USA have seen explosive growth.

The 2018 and 2020 elections were further proof, as the caucus of progressive legislators swelled. Bold women of color leaders like Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ayanna Pressley, Ilhan Omar, and Pramila Jayapal now lead the charge in Washington on everything from the Green New Deal to the Fight for $15 and more.

The mass death and destruction experienced in the past year because of coronavirus have only accelerated the trend of people questioning the status quo and looking for alternatives.

The pandemic has accelerated class struggle trends that were already becoming apparent. Increasingly, millions are questioning capitalism, as shown by this message spray-painted onto a wall in Toronto. | C.J. Atkins / People’s World

### Unsustainable---2NC

#### No profit motive and financialization is unsustainable.

Alan Maass 21. Communications staff for Rutgers AAUP-AFT. Marxism Shows Us How Our Problems Are Connected. Jacobin. 1-5-2021. https://jacobinmag.com/2021/01/marxism-capital-socialism-capitalism-book-review

When Things Fall Apart

Marxist economics explains not only how capitalism works but why it regularly doesn’t — during the periodic economic busts that inevitably follow the booms. As Marx and Engels wrote:

Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed. And why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce.

Of course, in a world where billions go without enough food, there’s no such thing as “too much means of subsistence.” There’s only too much from the point of view of the capitalists — too much to sell their products at an acceptable profit.

Thier introduces the chapters on capitalist crisis by unpacking a long quotation from Engels that ends: “The contradiction between socialized production and capitalistic appropriation is reproduced as the antagonism between the organization of production in the single factory and the anarchy of production in society as a whole.”

Under capitalism, production within workplaces is generally highly regimented, but the economy as a whole is a free-for-all. Businesses make their investment decisions behind closed doors, each hoping to get a leg up on the competition — by introducing the most popular model, the new product, the next trend. Success means a greater share of the market and therefore more profits.

All the important questions for society as a whole — how much food should be produced, how many homes to build, what kind of drugs to research and manufacture, how to generate electricity — are decided by the free market.

In economic good times, success seems contagious. Companies make ambitious investments, produce more and more, and watch the money roll in. But when enough companies jump in, the market gets saturated, sales slump, debts grow, and the record profits start to sink. The effects spread from part of the economy to the next, as Thier explains, using the example of oil:

If refineries sit idle because there is an overproduction of oil, the workers are laid off, and the creditors, who financed the investment, are dragged down as well. But as future oil extraction and refining projects are pulled back, so too is demand for the raw materials (steel, concrete, plastics, electricity, etc.) and engineering necessary for the production of oil rigs, pipelines, and so on. The construction business and service and retail companies, which had benefited from the springing up of oil boomtowns, suffer as well.

Because of the complexity of the international capitalist economy, the boom-slump roller-coaster ride can look and feel different each time around. Thier devotes a chapter to analyzing the crash last time: the Great Recession of 2008–9. She explains why and how the parasitical realm of banking and finance was the detonator of this slump but looks beyond popular left explanations about “financialization” to reveal the underlying crisis of global overproduction.

Among Marxist economics writers, there are some disagreements about the details here, specifically about “which aspects of Marx’s writing — falling profitability, overproduction (or in some cases, underproduction), disproportionality among branches, the role of credit — are emphasized and how these pieces fit together,” Thier writes.

In her account, Thier tends to stress overproduction, to the disappointment of those who emphasize falling profit rates. This focus on overproduction crucially emphasizes how an organic mechanism of capitalism — inevitable in a system driven by exchange, exploitation, and competition — repeatedly causes crisis.

#### COVID proves unsustainable.

Roberts & Smith ‘21 [Michael Roberts worked as an economist for over 40 years, Activist in British Labor Movement in Britain. Interviewed by Ashley Smith, Author at Specter Journal. “Out of Lockdown and Back into the Long Depression.” 7-6-21. <https://spectrejournal.com/out-of-lockdown-and-back-into-the-long-depression/> //shree]

The Covid slump of 2020-21 was basically a supply-side shock due to the global spread of the Covid-19 virus and the failure of governments in the major economies (with a few exceptions) to prevent its spread. There were delayed and bungled measures along with weakened health systems, so economies had to close down as lockdowns and isolation measures were the only answer to avoiding catastrophe. Economically, that meant supply stopped, and then that led to a collapse in demand as people were laid off and businesses crashed.

But recovery is now under way (more or less) in most major economies. Demand was propped up in the major advanced economies through massive government fiscal spending and central bank injections of credit for businesses (particularly large ones). And now through a combination of lockdowns and the incredibly fast development and rollout of effective vaccinations (thanks to publicly funded science), the major economies are now able to recover.

But in the G7 economies this initial recovery has the aspect of a “sugar rush.” The “sugar” of fiscal stimulus and historic levels of easy credit is infusing capitalist businesses and household spending with an energy boost.

Indeed, during the pandemic slump sections of capitalism did not suffer at all; on the contrary, they gained hugely, e.g., the social media and tech sector, the mega-distribution companies, and Big Pharma.

Better-off households also suffered less (at least materially) as they continued to be paid, could work at home, and saved income significantly. This led to a house purchase boom as these sectors of labour looked to change their lifestyles post-Covid.

At the same time, zero interest rates and cheap credit allowed financial institutions to make hay in financial markets and billionaire wealth rocketed as stock and bond markets hit historic highs.

But, for most manual workers in the cities and in low-paid service industries, the pandemic slump was a disaster and with little prospect of returning to “normal” for them in the recovery.

And it’s the advanced capitalist economies and the East Asian states that are recovering best in 2021-22. The so-called global South suffered hugely in the pandemic, with record levels of excess deaths and a massive rise in unemployment and poverty levels. Fiscal support from governments was limited and the rollout of vaccines to get economies going again is way short. Estimates are that the target vaccination levels in these countries will not be achieved until 2023-4!

So, what we are going to see is the major capitalist economies of the West and China returning to pre-pandemic levels of national output by the end of this year or in early 2022, but Latin America, Africa, South Asia failing to do so.

What are the weaknesses and contradictions of the recovery in those economies?

Before the pandemic, the world economy was slowing down. Real GDP growth rates in the G7 were dropping to just 1 percent or lower; the so-called emerging economies had growth rates down to 3 percent (hardly enough to cover increases in population). World trade was declining. Even the giant economies of China and India had slowed.

The main reason was that growth in investment in productive assets that can boost the productivity of labor and expand technology and employment had also slowed. In my view, investment and productivity growth are key to developing the productive forces of modern capitalist economies, and they were failing because under capitalism, profitability is the driving force behind investment.

And according to the best estimates, US and global profitability levels are at historic lows. This is the long-term result of the basic contradiction of capitalism: between raising the productivity of labour and sustaining profitability. Over the long term, this cannot be done, and this is the economic Achilles heel of capital.

#### Cap causes environmental extinction---depletion and waste crisis outpace technological gains.

Tony Smith 21. Professor emeritus of philosophy at Iowa State University. "The Deadly Metabolic Rift". https://againstthecurrent.org/atc211/the-deadly-metabolic-rift/

Monthly Review editor and University of Oregon professor of sociology John Bellamy Foster has written several books and numerous articles, beginning with Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature (2000), exploring the relevance of classical Marxist thought to grasping today’s existential environmental crises. Co-author Brett Clark is professor of sociology and sustainability studies at the University of Utah.

A small subset of the authors’ main claims will be highlighted here.

(1) There is indeed “an existential crisis in the human relation to the earth.” (1) Over the last 10,000 years planetary conditions fluctuated within relatively narrow and stable boundaries. The entire history of settled human civilizations has unfolded in this “Holocene” period of our planet’s life.

This period has now concluded. In a number of areas crucially important to humanity, these boundaries have been (or are about to be) transgressed: climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, global freshwater use, changes in land use, biodiversity loss, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution. (244)

Human activity is the main causal factor explaining this development, leading earth scientists to refer to the new period as the “Anthropocene.”

The authors of an important study cited by Foster and Clark warn that if the upper-range of projections of global warming were to occur it “would severely challenge the viability of contemporary human societies.”(1) When we recall how little has been done to prevent increased global warming, and how y-it is only one of the numerous planetary transformations imposing comparable risks on human societies, talk of an “existential threat” is fully warranted.

(2) There is no “technological fix” for this existential crisis. The more intelligent representatives of capital do not deny that serious environmental challenges must be faced. For them, however, this is best done by working with capitalist markets and not against them.

A carbon tax on polluting firms would give companies a strong market incentive to lower their costs by using technologies requiring fewer carbon emissions. Having to purchase rights to release carbon into the atmosphere in carbon markets would supposedly have the same effect, in their view.

There are also calls for the state to support firms undertaking massive geoengineering projects, such as sending aerosols into the upper atmosphere to reflect away the sun’s rays before they increase the planet’s surface temperature. Another proposal is to install technologies capable of extracting and sequestering significant amounts of carbon from the atmosphere.

As Foster and Clark remind us, technological change in capitalism tends to develop “greener” technologies without any special spur. Over the course of the industrial revolution, for example, each succeeding generation of steam engines became “greener” over time, burning less coal per unit of output than the one before. The total amount of coal burned in England increased nonetheless. (245)

This “Jevons paradox” (named after the British political economist who first brought it to attention) is easily explained: the increase in the number of units produced overwhelmed the reduction of coal use per unit, leading to more coal being burned overall.

Is there any reason to think that introducing technologies “greener” than those employed today won’t have a similarly paradoxical result? Investors in the stock market, whose pricing of oil companies’ stocks assumes that the last drop of oil in the ground will be profitably extracted, do not seem to think so. (243-4)

Engineering Disaster

Regarding geoengineering projects, Foster and Clark repeat the warning of many scientists that such unprecedented technological experiments would almost surely have pernicious consequences as harmful as the harms they are supposed to alleviate. (278)

Further, their massive scale would leave few resources for other social needs. An infrastructure capable of handling annual throughput 70 percent larger than that handled currently by the global crude oil industry would be required, along with ridiculous quantities of water — 130 billion tons annually just to capture and store U.S. emissions. (280)

Far from being a step towards socialism (as some techno-utopians of the left hold), government funded geoengineering would simply solidify an environmental industrial complex alongside the military industrial complex, the pharmaceutical industrial complex, and other complexes of big capital. (281-2)

Finally, once again, climate change is only one way in which present environmental trends will soon “severely challenge the viability of contemporary human societies.” In all the other cases too the sorts of technologies that have been developed, and the ways they have been used, have been part of the story of how we got to the present “existential crisis.”

Unless we figure out why that has been the case and eliminate that reason, to think we will be saved by technologies is to indulge in fantasy.

(3) Capitalism is the fundamental cause of the existential crisis in the relation between humans and the earth. All living beings appropriate resources from their environment and all generate wastes back into their surroundings. For a species to successfully occupy an environmental niche, the rate at which it depletes resources from its ecosystem must correspond to the rate they are replenished, and the rate it generates wastes must be aligned with the rate

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wastes can be processed.

When the social forms of capitalism are in place, neither condition is met, creating the metabolic rift between human society and its environment.

Capitalist market societies are distinguished from other societies in that products generally take the form of commodities sold for a profit. Any capitalist producers who do not attempt to make as much profit as possible, as fast as possible, will find themselves losing market share to those who do, if not forced out of existence altogether.

Making as much profit as possible, as fast as possible, generally means producing and selling as many commodities as possible, as fast as possible. This accelerated temporality is in tension with the temporality of our environment; resources tend to be depleted at a faster rate than they can be replenished, and wastes generated at a faster rate than they can be processed.

From this standpoint the “Jevons Para­dox” is less a paradox than a general description of how capitalism works. Any environmental benefits from technologies using fewer natural resources or generating fewer wastes per unit of production necessarily tends to be overwhelmed by the increase in the number of commodities produced in response to the “Grow or die!” imperative so ruthlessly imposed by the demands of capital accumulation.

From Local to Global Destruction

In the early phases of capitalist development, environmental destruction was relatively localized. After a handful of centuries of global expansion, it has sucked in re­sources from the natural world and spewed out wastes on a global scale, creating a fundamental rift in the metabolic relationship between human beings and the earth that is our home.

### Innovation---2NC

#### No decoupling.

Ehrenreich ‘21 [Ben Ehrenreich. Journalist, author of Desert Notebooks: A Roadmap for the End of Time. “We’re Hurtling Toward Global Suicide.” The New Republic. 3-18-21. <https://newrepublic.com/article/161575/climate-change-effects-hurtling-toward-global-suicide> //shree]

A strange sort of faith lies at the core of mainstream climate advocacy—a largely unexamined belief that the very system that got us into this mess is the one that will get us out of it. For a community putatively committed to scientific empiricism, this is an extraordinary conviction. Despite reams of increasingly apocalyptic research, and despite 25 years of largely fruitless international climate negotiations, carbon emissions have continued to rise, and temperatures along with them. We are at nearly 1.2 degrees Celsius of warming already—more than 2 degrees Fahrenheit over preindustrial averages—and three-tenths of a degree away from blowing the Paris accord’s aspiration to limit warming to a still-calamitous 1.5 degrees Celsius. Scientists now expect us to hit that threshold in about 10 years, and large swaths of the Arctic have been in actual flames for two summers running, but most governments with the option to do so are still feeding the beast that got us here.

Even with the grim opportunity presented by the Covid-19 pandemic, which slowed the economy so much that growth in fossil fuel production dropped an almost unprecedented 7 percent last year, governments—ours very much included—have so far dumped much more stimulus spending into high-carbon industries than into renewable energy. It’s as if our economic system, and the politics it breeds, will not allow us to diverge from the straight path to self-obliteration.

The faith nonetheless persists: The market will provide. It has not done so yet, but renewables are perhaps finally cheap enough—cheaper at last than conventional energy sources—that the transition is now inevitable. So the credo goes. The change that is coming will be largely technological: a bold new era of “green growth.” Modern societies erected on dirty coal and oil can be jacked up and shifted to cleaner forms of energy like an old house in need of a new foundation. Government may have a larger role in this transition than neoliberal dogma has recently allowed, but its primary task will still be to encourage innovation and feed the markets by shepherding the resulting growth.

It is no coincidence that some version of this faith, so all-pervasive now that it does not register as a piety, has been reshaping the planet for almost precisely as long as fossil energy—first coal, then oil—has been altering the atmosphere. Capitalism is guided by a carbon creed, an ecstatic vision of a market that chugs along eternally, needing only new inputs—the earth itself, commodified as minerals, or water, housing, health care, or almost any living thing—to spew out wealth that can be shoveled back into the machine, converting more and more of the biosphere into zeros in a digital account: more fleshless, magical money that can be invested once again. If appetites are bottomless, and apparently they are, shouldn’t growth be endless too?

The market’s grip on the political imagination so effectively blinds us to alternatives that we are unable fully to grasp that this is the basic script that the new administration is following. Even the Green New Deal does not substantively diverge from it. The climate crisis, an existential threat to planetary life, must be sold to Wall Street and the public at large as a growth opportunity. On January 31, John Kerry, acting as Biden’s new climate envoy, enthused to CNN’s Fareed Zakaria about “literally millions of jobs” that would soon be created, about all the “new products coming online,” and about oil companies’ newfound passion for “carbon capture and storage and so forth.” The private sector, he said, “has already made the decision that there is money to be made here, that’s capitalism, and they are investing in that future.” If that makes you nervous, it shouldn’t, Kerry insisted. The changes ahead would be like the analog-to-digital shift of the 1990s, only better: “the important point, Fareed, for people to really focus on is it’s a very exciting economic transition.”

If Kerry struck a cheerier tone than that of the doomsaying consensus in the scientific community, it wasn’t just a question of polishing a turd. “Green growth” is mainstream climate discourse. A “green transition” that does not significantly alter existing economic structures—or their vast inequities—is still, for most climate advocates, the only imaginable way forward. Kerry was speaking a made-for-TV version of the sole language available to him—one that in its most basic assumptions excludes the possibility of fundamental social transformation, and of any heresy that casts doubt on the Great God Growth. The one thing all those thousands of scientists agree on is our only hope—that the economic structures that mediate our relation to the planet must be profoundly altered—is the one thing that Kerry and Biden are quite careful not to consider at all.

In climate policy jargon, the crucial concept is “decoupling.” The notion lies deep in the hidden heart of the “sustainable development goals” held dear by international bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank: Economic growth can be safely divorced from the ecological damage that it has heretofore almost universally wreaked. If the train of capital appears to be hurtling us toward the abyss, we can cut the engine loose and cruise someplace more comfortable: same train, same speed, different destination. Like millions of clean-tech jobs and a crisis-induced transition magically unlocking unimaginable wealth, it is an attractive and reassuring idea. The only problem is that there is next to no evidence that anything analogous has ever occurred, or that it is likely to occur in the future.

Examples of successful decoupling tend to involve shifts in the location rather than the nature of industrial production: Rich countries green their economies by offshoring the manufacture of the goods they consume to China and countries in the global south, which they can then chastise for their lax emissions standards. But Earth’s atmosphere is not divided by national boundaries

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What policy wonks call “absolute decoupling”—the only kind that would do the climate any good—turns out to be a fantasy akin to a perpetual motion machine, a chimera of growth unhindered by material constraints. One recent analysis of 835 peer-reviewed articles on the subject found that the kind of massive and speedy reductions in emissions that would be necessary to halt global warming “cannot be achieved through observed decoupling rates.” The mechanism on which mainstream climate policy is betting the future of the species, and on which the possibility of green growth rests, appears to be a fiction.

This fiction is nonetheless fundamental to the very math used by international climate institutions. In 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s benchmark Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5oC—which announced in no uncertain terms that global emissions must be decreased by nearly half by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050 to avoid cataclysm at an almost unthinkable scale—set out a number of possible scenarios for policymakers to consider. It relied on algorithmic models linking greenhouse gas emissions and their climate impacts to various socioeconomic “pathways.” Whatever other variables they accounted for, though, all of the scenarios envisioned by the IPCC assumed the continuation of economic growth comparable to the past half-century’s. Even as they acknowledged levels of atmospheric carbon unseen in the last three million years, they were unable to conceive of an economy that does not perpetually expand. Fredric Jameson’s oft-cited dictum that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism was baked into the actual modeling.

At the same time, all but one of the ­IPCC’s scenarios that envision us successfully limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius rely on the use of technology to remove carbon from the atmosphere after the fact. (The one exception involves converting an area more than half the size of the United States to forest. None of the scenarios imagines that we can reach the 1.5 degrees Celsius target by cutting emissions alone.) But the technology in question is at this point largely speculative. “No proposed technology is close to deployment at scale,” the report’s authors concede, and “there is substantial uncertainty” about possible “adverse effects” on the environment. The international body, in other words, is more willing to gamble on potentially destructive technologies that do not currently exist than to even run the math on a more substantive economic transformation.

A version of this same wager animates the Biden climate plan, which, as Canada, the European Union, the U.K., and South Korea all have, commits to “net-zero emissions no later than 2050.” (China plans to reach the same goal by 2060.) This sounds like great news, and is without doubt worlds better than the status quo ante of no ambitions at all. But “net zero” is a slippery notion. It does not mean zero at all. To avoid exceeding 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming, emissions need to fall 7.6 percent every year for the next 10 years. Even with the pandemic-induced slowdown, global emissions shrank only 6.4 percent in 2020. Since, as Biden reassured a nervous oil industry during the campaign, “We’re not getting rid of fossil fuels for a long time,” net-zero calculations assume some degree of “overshoot”—i.e., they stipulate that we’re not going to be able to cut emissions fast enough, and that we’ll therefore have to rely on those same untested carbon removal technologies to eventually bring us to zero.

But a planet is not a balance sheet. The climate has tipping points—the collapse of the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets and the Himalayan glaciers, the deterioration of Atlantic Ocean currents, the melting of the permafrost, the transition of the Amazon from rain forest to savannah. We are perilously close to hitting some of them already: In February, 31 people were killed and 165 went missing when a chunk of a Himalayan glacier broke off, releasing an explosive burst of meltwater and debris. In the most nightmarish scenario, which could be tripped with less than 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) of warming, those tipping points could begin to trigger one another and cascade, locking us in, as one widely cited study put it, to “conditions that would be inhospitable to current human societies and to many other contemporary species.” Without major emissions cuts, we may reach 2 degrees Celsius of warming before 2050.

That’s a heavy risk to bet against, but there it is, pulsing away inside the net-zero promises that not only politicians but corporate boards have been proudly rolling out. Over the last two years, more and more corporations in fossil fuel–intensive industries—BP, Shell, Maersk, GM, Ford, Volkswagen, at least a dozen major airlines—have made similar pledges. Shell’s plan alone would require tree planting over an area nearly the size of Brazil. By the estimate of the NGO ActionAid, “there is simply not enough available land on the planet to accommodate all of the combined corporate and government ‘net zero’ plans” for offsets and carbon-sinking tree plantations. To save this planet, it appears we’ll need another one. This is what currently counts as pragmatism.

## T

### AT: Competing Models---1AR

#### Comparing “models” is a nationalist tactic---the search for “competitive advantage” universalizes the search for difference.

Pauli Kettunen 11. Professor of Political History in the Social Science Faculty of University of Helsinki. “Welfare Nationalism and Competitive Community.” In Welfare citizenship and welfare nationalism.

Conclusion: the nationalism of models

In conclusion, the concept of “model” deserves some attention. The current discussion on models is inspired by the encounters between globalised capital and national institutions, and it indicates increasing reflexivity as an aspect of globalisation. The popularity of the concept of “the Nordic model” since the 1980s implies such a shift of perspective. Reflexivity is nourished by the imperatives of competitiveness, which include the need for continuous comparisons in order to learn the universal “best practice” or to find the “difference”, i.e. an edge, one’s own particular competitive advantage. European integration has provided an important context for the discussion on models.

An interesting ambiguity appears in the current usage of the concept of model. It may refer to a structure that has become threatened through globalisation, or it may refer to a way of responding to the challenge. The former meaning is obvious in the discussion on the threats against the “Nordic welfare-state model”. The latter, in turn, is manifested in the praising of “the Danish model” of “flexicurity”46, or “the Finnish model” as a paragon of consensual competitiveness in a new knowledge-based society47, or “the Nordic model” in general, assessed to be capable of embracing globalisation by means of risk sharing48. In both cases – the model as a target of threats or the model as a response – globalisation is dealt with as a national challenge. Yet the ambiguity of the concept of model indicates the changing role of the nation state, which can be characterised by the concepts of welfare state and competition state. Instead of a shift from the welfare state to a competition state, the change reflected by the two sides of the concept of the “Nordic model” can be interpreted as a conversion in which welfare-state institutions are modified to serve competition-state functions.

### AT: SSD/TVA---1AR

#### Switch side and topical version domesticate difference---eliminates radical potential.

Nicholas C. BURBULES 2K, Professor of Education at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign [“The Limits of Dialogue as a Critical Pedagogy” in *Revolutionary Pedagogies*, ed. by Peter Trifonas, 2000, p.260-262, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

The third failing was to conceive difference solely in the sense of categorical diversity. As Homi Bhabha and others argue, cultural difference can be taken in a different way: as a less stable, noncategorical dimension that is a feature of lived [END PAGE 260] experience and identity.19 From this standpoint, differences are enacted. They change over time. They take shape differently in varied contexts. They surpass our attempts to classify or define them. Ellsworth puts it well, that the purpose of dialogue is not just speaking across given positions of difference, but a relation in which those very positions can be (need to be) questioned. Difference, then, is more than a matter of multicultural diversity, of speaking within and across stable identities; it is a challenge to these in three ways, which I have sketched in more recent work as differences within, differences beyond, and differences against. 20 Respectively, these three phrases refer to the ways in which: (1) difference stands not only as an external feature of the “other,” but as an unexplored and unrecognized dimension of one’s self (for example, in the ways by which heterosexuality is defined and defended implicitly as not-homosexual, thereby invoking its “opposite” as a part of its own self-conception); (2) difference exceeds categories of understanding, challenging these in ways that confound conventional vocabularies and assumptions (for example, when racial categories such as “black” and “white” become denaturalized and subject to all sorts of redefinitions, including those of skin color themselves [no one actually has black or white skin], the conflating of racial with national or ethnic differences, the emphasis on hybrid, creole, or border identities, and so on); and (3) difference is defined by its resistance, defined against dominant norms, and its persistent refusal to allow itself to be characterized from dominant, conventional points of view. In each of these three ways difference poses a fundamental challenge to views of dialogue oriented around achieving understanding or agreement— each, in its own way, is a repudiation of convergent models of discourse generally, and each, in its own way, resists the categorical characterization of diversity— no category can possibly contain these sorts of difference.

It is possible to put the point even more strongly: that the effect of traditional views of dialogue has been to “domesticate” difference: to make it safe and comprehensible by regarding all differences as elements of mere variation (diversity), and hence as starting points of potential reconciliation. This is not a neutral standpoint, even as it represents itself as such; it misses deeper, more radical conceptions of difference.

Dialogue as Decontextualized Pedagogy

The crucial shift in perspective outlined here is from a prescriptive model of dialogue as a neutral communicative process, a procedure in which all participants are treated equally, concerned only with the search for knowledge, understanding, and perhaps agreement, to dialogue as a situated practice, one implicated by the particulars of who, when, where, and how the dialogue takes place. The elevation of [END PAGE 261] dialogue as a general pedagogical method abstracts its operations from those particulars and, as noted earlier, treats deviations from that ideal as either illegitimate violations of its rules or as unfortunate shortcomings that can be remedied through the application of more of the same— continuing with dialogue until these failures of understanding or agreement can be remedied. Radical difference, difference that resists accommodation or assimilation, is rendered inexplicable or perverse. But when one examines the who, when, where, and how of dialogue, such characterizations become much more difficult to defend.21

WHO. The first issue begins with the growing diversity of classrooms (at all levels of education) and the increasing awareness of the margins or borders of common school culture as it interacts with the very different values and orientations that students bring to the classroom. The conditions of globalization and mobility have promoted both direct forms of migration across national/cultural categories and (especially with the rise of new communication and information technologies) an increasing proximity and interaction of multiple lines of national/cultural influence. In this context, the central assumptions of common schooling— of a canon of texts, of a shared historical tradition, of a common language— are thrown into question, since even where such elements might be defended, their value and significance are going to be regarded differently from different positions as teachers and students. In some cases they will be directly challenged. The shift to a dialogical approach, in itself, does not remedy these conflicts; and when more radical conceptions of difference are at stake, the very notion of “remedying” such conflicts and disagreements becomes deeply problematic.

A dialogue is not an engagement of two (or more) abstract persons, but of people with characteristics, styles, values, and assumptions that shape the particular ways in which they engage in discourse. Any prescriptive conception of dialogue must confront the challenge of acknowledging persons who do not engage in communication through those forms and who might in fact be excluded or disadvantaged by them. Conversely, an account of dialogue that acknowledges the enormous multiplicity of forms in which people from different cultures do enact pedagogical communicative relations (let alone communicative relations generally) needs to address the question of why some versions are rewarded with the prescriptive label “dialogue” and others are not.